The Stock Market Declined, Now What?

“Don’t let short-run fluctuations, market psychology, false hope, fear, and greed get in the way of good investment judgment.” – John Bogle.

Last week I was contacted by Sarah Morgan, a writer for SmartMoney.com, who had some questions about the recent volatility and decline in the stock market.  Normally, I don’t respond to the press, but her initial question struck me to my core.  Ms. Morgan wanted to know if clients were panicking.  My clients?  Panicking?  She obviously did not know me or my investment philosophy.  My email response to her was this, “I would take it as a tremendous failure of education and preparation if my clients were panicking now.”  

I went on to say that in trying to time the market (which, as I’ve said before, is patently impossible) investors are more likely to hurt themselves by not being invested when the rebound comes.  And, as historical data prove, there is always a rebound, because the long-term trend is up.

I admit that I took pride in being able to tell Ms. Morgan that clients of Key Financial Solutions do not panic.  Rather, they sit and hold tight and ride out the roller coaster.  They’re prepared for short-term fluctuations and declines, simply because they have a long term plan.

Their Investment Policy Statement specifies a well-balanced portfolio that includes a combination of stock mutual funds and bonds (in ratios that we have decided upon, based upon time horizon, risk tolerance, etc.).  So, even a 10% decline in the stock market has little effect on my clients.  And should a market decline be steep enough to affect a portfolio, rebalancing – selling some (appreciated) bonds and buying some (now, underweight) equities – is appropriate to reestablish the portfolio’s target mix.     

That information was enough to spur a half-hour long phone conversation and a follow-up email. 

It was gratifying to read the article, After Market Slide, What’s Your Next Move?, and not just because I was quoted.  No, I was happy to see that Ms. Morgan got it right. She quoted a number of people who said that long-term investing is the key to success.

Having a well thought out Investment Policy Statement is the best chance I know of to stick with a long-term plan.  When markets experience extreme volatility, it sure helps to have a strategy that is based on more than a prediction of what today’s news means to your investment portfolio.

And what are the rewards of long-term investing versus the risk of getting out of the market?  Christopher Davis of Davis Advisors gave a presentation at the NAPFA (National Association of Personal Financial Advisors) National Conference.  Here is what he reported.

Average Annual Returns for 1995 – 2009 for investing in the S&P 500

8.0%		for Staying the Course
3.2%		if you missed the 10 best days
-2.6%		if you missed the 30 best days
-9.2%		if you missed the 60 best days

 

For a fifteen year period, if you missed the 30 best days, you could have managed to lose 2.6% per year, versus earning 8.0% per year.  Thirty days in 15 years!

So let me turn the original question on its head, “Why would anyone risk being out of the stock market?”

Goldman Sachs: Banker or Bookie?

Late last week, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Goldman Sachs with investor fraud.  It seems that they chose not to disclose all of the terms of one of their own financial products.  After reading the analysis of the events, I have just got to ask:  Are these bankers or bookies?  Goldman Sachs, among other large Wall Street firms, appears to be running a legal bookie operation, catering to clients who wanted to place large bets on the outcome of certain financial events.  You’ve heard the expression, if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck… The real question: was the game rigged?  We’ll have to wait and see.

Last month, in a post about Greed and Delusion on Wall Street, I said

It’s difficult to appreciate the amount of backstabbing, mistrust and cynicism that is endemic at Wall Street firms. “Wall Street doesn’t care what it sells.” Investment banks exploited their institutional customers (pension funds, mutual funds, banks). The same firm that is advising them on what to invest in (the sell side) also has an in-house operation that is trading for its own account. Why is this blatant conflict of interest allowed?

Incredibly, I may have actually understated the problem!  It seems to me that it is patently impossible to be cynical enough, at least about some Wall Street firms.

Why do I say that?  Well, the suit filed by the SEC alleges that Goldman Sachs put together a package of derivatives based on subprime mortgages and did not disclose that the components were selected by the party who wanted to bet against the investment, i.e. sell short.  The claim is that the security was “designed to fail.”  Please take note of the word “alleged,” meaning that they may or may not have done something illegal.  Because it’s a civil lawsuit which may take years to adjudicate, Goldman Sachs will have ample opportunity to present its side of the story.  I have complete confidence that they will hire the best lawyers that megabucks can buy.

Even if Goldman Sachs “wins” that lawsuit, they may have lost something infinitely more valuable – their reputation.  To my mind, this is no small thing, since confidence in your advisor is (or should be) of paramount importance to investment bankers, including Goldman Sachs.  I am compelled to ask one more question, though, did these bankers aim to protect investors’ interests or were they just determined to make a profit at all costs? 

What Is the Public Value of Trading in Synthetic Securities?

But as investors and citizens, it is worth pondering whether all of this trading activity has a social purpose or is it merely gambling in a more refined form.  The topic of synthetic financial derivatives is highly complex and difficult for most ordinary mortals to understand.  But Roger Lowenstein’s column, Gambling With the Economy in the April 20^th edition of The New York Times, offers an excellent summary of the arguments:

Wall Street’s purpose, you will recall, is to raise money for industry: to finance steel mills and technology companies and, yes, even mortgages. But the collateralized debt obligations involved in the Goldman trades, like billions of dollars of similar trades sponsored by most every Wall Street firm, raised nothing for nobody. In essence, they were simply a side bet — like those in a casino — that allowed speculators to increase society’s mortgage wager without financing a single house.

The mortgage investment that is the focus of the S.E.C.’s civil lawsuit against Goldman, Abacus 2007-AC1, didn’t contain any actual mortgage bonds. Rather, it was made up of credit default swaps that “referenced” such bonds. Thus the investors weren’t truly “investing” — they were gambling on the success or failure of the bonds that actually did own mortgages. Some parties bet that the mortgage bonds would pay off; others (notably the hedge fund manager John Paulson) bet that they would fail. But no actual bonds — and no actual mortgages — were created or owned by the parties involved.

The S.E.C. suit charges that the bonds referenced in Goldman’s Abacus deal were hand-picked (by Mr. Paulson) to fail. Goldman says that Abacus merely allowed Mr. Paulson to bet one way and investors to bet the other. But either way, is this the proper function of Wall Street? Is this the sort of activity we want within regulated (and implicitly Federal Reserve-protected) banks like Goldman?

While such investments added nothing of value to the mortgage industry, they weren’t harmless. They were one reason the housing bust turned out to be more destructive than anyone predicted. Initially, remember, the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, and others insisted that the damage would be confined largely to subprime loans, which made up only a small part of the mortgage market. But credit default swaps greatly multiplied the subprime bet. In some cases, a single mortgage bond was referenced in dozens of synthetic securities. The net effect: investments like Abacus raised society’s risk for no productive gain.

Conclusion

I find Lowenstein’s points very convincing, and I totally agree with his recommendations.
“ …the financial bailout has demonstrated that big Wall Street banks … (have) implicit bailout protection. Protected entities should not be using (potentially) public capital to run non-productive gambling tables.
… Congress should take up the question of whether parties with no stake in the underlying instrument should be allowed to buy or sell credit default swaps. If it doesn’t ban the practice, it should at least mandate that regulators set stiff capital requirements on swaps for such parties so that they will not overleverage themselves again to society’s detriment. …”

Proposed reforms by the Obama administration will hopefully rein in the questionable activities of Wall Street bankers, although, Wall Street lobbyists will naturally attempt to defeat any such reform. As I said previously, we’ll have to wait and see, but nearly a week later, no further charges from the SEC have been forthcoming. Of note, however, several European countries have commenced the filing of similar charges against Goldman Sachs.

Apollo 13

“Houston, we have a problem” is one of the great understatements (and oft quoted lines) in movie dialogue. Those words set the stage for the amazing drama of the Apollo 13 moon exploration mission, which took place exactly 40 years ago this month. The great 1995 movie is based on the book, “Lost Moon,” which was co-authored by one of the Apollo 13 astronauts, Jim Lovell, who is played by the ever talented (and understated) Tom Hanks.

No early space mission was ever routine, certainly not in 1970. The astronauts learned their jobs through extensive and thorough training, including hours upon hours of practice in space simulators, reliance on checklists, and their previous experience as (primarily) test pilots. Even so, problems were not unusual.

But the Apollo 13 mission suffered not an ordinary problem but a catastrophic explosion in space, resulting in loss of oxygen, power and a fully functioning guidance system. The 3-man crew faced the possibility of freezing to death, suffocating and being poisoned by their own carbon dioxide exhalation. And that was before they had to manually calculate (on a slide rule, no less) and maneuver their craft into position so that they could get back to earth and land safely, without being incinerated as they passed through the earth’s atmosphere in a module that was damaged to an unknown extent.

At one point, the NASA Flight Director, Gene Kranz, as played by Ed Harris, grandly states that, ”failure is not an option.”  In truth, success was highly improbable.

The movie simultaneously covers NASA’s Mission Control’s race to save the astronauts, what was going on inside Apollo 13, and how the families of the astronauts coped, as the rest of the world watched the events unfold on live television. It is an exhilarating story of calm courage, professionalism, teamwork, perseverance, and ingenuity.

I highly recommend Apollo 13, because it is so realistic, wonderfully acted and tells a gripping story so well. For me, it also doesn’t hurt that it yields a strong dose of optimism about American know-how. Available in DVD, Apollo 13 is skillfully directed by Ron Howard, and has an excellent ensemble cast including Bill Paxton, Kevin Bacon, Gary Sinise and Kathleen Quinlan.

Keeping Your Investment Balance, Part 2

In my last post on the subject, I introduced the idea of monitoring and maintaining a portfolio’s asset allocation. 

Determining when and how to effectively rebalance your portfolio requires careful monitoring of not only portfolio performance, but awareness of your tax status, cash flow, financial goals, and tolerance for risk.  The act of portfolio rebalancing results in transaction fees and has the potential to incur capital gains in taxable accounts. Thus, while there may be good reasons to rebalance, the benefits must outweigh the costs.

Given these challenges, a practical approach to rebalancing takes into consideration the occurrence of “triggering” points, yet provides enough flexibility that costs are effectively managed and minimized.

When to Rebalance

Defining triggering points helps us decide when to rebalance. Most experts recommend rebalancing when asset group weightings move outside a specified range of their target allocations.  This may be widely defined according to either a stock-bond mix or to a percentage drift away from target weightings for categories like small cap stocks, international stocks, and the like.

How to Rebalance

While rebalancing costs are unavoidable, several strategies can help minimize the impact:

• Rebalance with new cash. Rather than selling over-weighted assets that have appreciated, use new cash to buy more under-weighted assets; this reduces transaction costs and the tax consequences of selling assets.
• Whenever possible, rebalance in the tax-deferred or tax-exempt accounts where capital gains are not realized.
• Incorporate tax management within taxable accounts, such as strategic loss harvesting, dividend management, and gain/loss matching.
• Implement an integrated portfolio strategy. In other words, rather than maintaining rigid barriers between component asset classes and accounts, manage the portfolio as a whole.

Conclusion

While there are good reasons to adjust portfolio risk by rebalancing, it does incur real costs that can detract from returns. A good strategy includes determining which investment components can acceptably drift, and adopting tax-saving and cost-saving strategies during rebalancing. In helping our clients rebalance, we strive to develop a structured plan that remains flexible to each individual’s unique blend of goals, risk tolerances, cash flow, and tax status.

No one knows where the capital markets will go—and that’s the point. In an uncertain world, investors should have a well-defined, globally diversified strategy and manage their portfolio to implement it over time. Rebalancing is a crucial tool in this effort.

Moreover, if and when your overall financial goals or risk tolerance change, you have a foundation for making adjustments. In the absence of a plan, adjustments are a matter of guesswork.

Wall Street Greed and Delusion

Derivatives (complex financial instruments) are time bombs and “financial weapons of mass destruction” that could harm not only their buyers and sellers, but the whole economic system.

“Derivatives generate reported earnings that are often wildly overstated and based on estimates whose inaccuracy may not be exposed for many years.”

Warren Buffet (2003)

After seeing Michael Lewis on both 60 Minutes and The Charlie Rose Show last week, I had to read The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine, the just released book by Lewis about the subprime mortgage disaster. Lewis is a fabulous story teller, and I cannot recommend this book enough.

He tells how the subprime mortgage market was created, who benefited, who lost, the cons, the dupes and the dopes and “how some of Wall Street’s finest minds managed to destroy $1.75 trillion of wealth in the subprime mortgage markets” and created the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

Essentially billions of dollars were lent to people who had very little chance of ever paying it back. And Wall Street firms earned billions of dollars creating, packaging and betting on complex financial instruments whose raw material was the risky mortgage loans they created. And that was just the beginning.

Tremendous leverage (using borrowed money to magnify possible returns) increased the risk of destroying entire firms.

Lewis follows a few very colorful individuals who gradually figured out just how corrupt the entire risky mortgage system was. These investors made billions by betting against the subprime market by selling short.

Note that “selling short” is an entirely legal transaction, but generally considered a high risk one that involves betting against something, i.e. a stock, bond, or currency, for example, which isn’t “actually” owned by the investor. Selling short requires astuteness, foresight, excellent timing and staying power. Being “right” too soon can be both nerve wracking and very costly, because until the market agrees with your assessment, you are at risk of losing a great deal of money. (Disclosure: I do not sell short.)

In reading Lewis’s gripping story, I alternated between nodding my head in recognition of the self-serving greed that categorized Wall Street to shaking my head in disbelief that Wall Street bankers could have been so deluded that they ended up believing their own lies, I mean “models.” As I read, I found myself laughing out loud more times than I can count – truly, Lewis has a way with words.

To give you some background info, in the “old” days, a bank lent money to a home buyer and they held the mortgage. The bank was very serious about getting repaid, so before they agreed to fund the loan, they did some rather basic things like verify the borrowers’ creditworthiness, check their employment and salary history and retain an appraiser to assess the value of the property being bought. A good credit history, a stable job and a property value that would support the loan were enough incentive for banks, back in the “old” days, to grant a loan request.

But when banks started selling the mortgage to a Wall Street firm who repackaged the loan and then sold the package to investors, the incentives became very different. It was like the Wild West before the Marshall came to town to establish law and order.

The acronym IBGYBG came into being. The brokers who made more money than they ever imagined said, “I’ll be gone, you’ll be gone” so let’s not worry about the suckers who will probably lose their homes or the gullible institutions that bought the crappy investments in the purposely opaque financial instruments. And it was easy to rationalize the sleazy behavior, because, after all, it was possible that this will all work out, if home prices keep rising. That was a big IF.

It was really a mammoth legal Ponzi scheme, or as Lewis called it a “mass delusion.”

The individual character’s stories are fascinating, but I will not try to summarize them. Instead, here are some observations that emphasize the need for fundamental financial regulation of Wall Street firms.

1. No one goes to Wall Street investment banks to make the world a better place. “Greed on Wall Street is assumed – almost an obligation. The problem was the system of incentives that channeled the greed.”
2. People see what they have an incentive to see. Wall Street employees, managers and CEOs had an incentive (i.e. huge bonuses – surely, you’ve heard about them) not to see the truth.
3. When Wall Street firms were partnerships and the principals had their own money at risk, they had a sane long-term approach to their business operations. When these same firms became publicly traded corporations, risk was transferred to the shareholders. But, of course, huge bonuses were paid to successful traders based on one year’s results. In the short term, traders had every incentive to take large risks. “Heads I win, tails someone else loses, perhaps some time in the future.”
4. The fixed income (bonds) world dwarfs the equity (stocks) world in size. The stock market is transparent and heavily policed. On the other hand, “bond salesmen could say and do anything without worrying that they would be caught. Bond technicians could dream up ever more complicated securities without worrying too much about government regulation – one reason why so many derivatives had been derived, one way or another, from bonds.”
5. The world of mortgage-backed securities (pooled investments backed by mortgages) and derivatives (financial instruments created by Wall Street) were intentionally difficult to understand, so no one even bothered to try. The book describes the nature of asset-backed securities, tranches, collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, etc. You, dear reader, can safely skip those portions if you want to. The horse is already out of the barn.
6. It’s difficult to appreciate the amount of backstabbing, mistrust and cynicism that is endemic at Wall Street firms. “Wall Street doesn’t care what it sells.” Investment banks exploited their institutional customers (pension funds, mutual funds, banks). The same firm that is advising them on what to invest in (the sell side) also has an in-house operation that is trading for its own account. Why is this blatant conflict of interest allowed?
7. While there may have been some criminal behavior, in the end, group think, mass delusion and incompetence were more important factors. Wall Street firms did not understand the money-making machine they had created or the risks they had taken.
8. When lenders ran out of customers who would qualify for a normal mortgage, they dreamt up new ways to lend to people who could not afford to pay the old fashioned way. Hence the introduction of “interest-only negative-amortizing adjustable-rate subprime mortgages.” Translation: you don’t have to pay any principal or any interest on your new mortgage; we’ll just keep adding that to the amount you owe.
9. Amazingly enough, Wall Street firms convinced bond ratings agencies (Moody’s, S&P) to give such garbage a Triple A rating. That credit rating agencies are “educated” by and paid by the issuers of the bonds is quite a conflict of interest! And it still exists.
10. Lewis asserts that today “nobody believes that Wall Street knows what it is doing.” He understands why Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, for example, want a say in how they are regulated. He wonders why anyone would listen to them.

Conclusion

The greed and miscalculation of Wall Street firms caused the near collapse of the world economy. Governments around the world felt forced to commit trillions of dollars to resuscitate the banks.

Regulation of firms and people which have fundamentally the wrong incentives will not be easy. Regulatory reform of institutions that are too well connected to fail will not be easy. Change is never easy. But it is absolutely essential or we will all be at risk of a repeat performance of the last financial crisis. Without reform, the investment banking system can crash again, taking with it jobs, savings and U.S. tax payer dollars.

Keeping Your Investment Balance, Part 1

When meeting with new clients, I always discuss risk and return before helping them design a portfolio that will meet their needs.  We live in an uncertain world, so there are no guarantees, and generally, risk and reward go hand in hand. I help my clients arrive at a portfolio that is well diversified and, most importantly, has an acceptable (for them) risk profile.  It allows my clients to “stay the course,” even when market declines occur, as they inevitably will.

While global diversification gives investors a valuable tool for managing risk and volatility in a portfolio, it requires maintenance.  Over time, asset classes have different returns. This is inevitable and, in fact, desirable. A portfolio that holds assets that perform dissimilarly will experience less overall volatility, and that results in a smoother ride over time.

However, dissimilar performance can also change the integrity of your asset mix or allocation – a condition known as “asset drift.” As some assets appreciate in value and others lose relative value, your portfolio’s allocation changes, which affects its risk and return qualities. If you let the allocation drift far enough away from your original target, you end up with a very different portfolio.

If you do nothing, “asset drift” will cause your portfolio to deviate from your long range plan and risk tolerance.  As I said, even a well diversified portfolio requires maintenance.

Rebalancing is the remedy. To rebalance, you sell some assets that have risen in value and buy more of assets that have dropped in value. The purpose of rebalancing is to move a portfolio back to its original target allocation. This restores strategic structure in the portfolio and puts you back on track to pursue long-term goals.

Why rebalance?

At first glance, rebalancing seems counter-intuitive. Why sell a portion of outperforming asset groups and acquire a larger share of underperforming ones? A common reaction is to want to buy what has gone up, because you think it will continue to outperform.  This logic is flawed, however, because past performance may not continue in the future.  In reality, there’s no reliable way to predict future returns.  The old stock broker mantra (slightly modified, simply because you can’t predict the future) holds true, “Buy lower, sell higher.”

Equally important, remember that you chose your original asset allocation to reflect your risk and return preferences. Rebalancing realigns your portfolio to these priorities by using structure, not recent performance, to drive investment decisions. Periodic rebalancing also encourages dispassionate decision making – an essential quality during times of market volatility.

Conclusion

In the real world, portfolio allocations can be complex, incorporating not only fixed income and stocks, but also the multiple asset groups within equity investing. And, of course, tax considerations are very important.

In summary, to ensure that a portfolio’s risk and return characteristics remain consistent over time, a portfolio must be rebalanced.  Rebalancing is a tool to control risk and also an antidote to becoming too optimistic or too pessimistic.  You are, in effect, buying low and selling high, whether you want to or not.

Determining when and how to effectively rebalance is the subject of Part 2.

Consumer Protection: Funny & Serious

 

“This isn’t liberal or conservative.” – Elizabeth Warren.

Why would six former presidents (two of whom are deceased) take the trouble to visit President Obama? And who arranged this “Presidential Reunion”? For the answer, visit Funny or Die, the popular comedy Web site.

Of course, consumer protection is really no laughing matter, especially if you or someone you know is paying 18% interest on credit cards or has seen their mortgage payments balloon to unpayable (i.e. forecloseable) amounts.

For a detailed, intelligent 20 minute discussion of the issue, click on the Charlie Rose interview with Elizabeth Warren, the Chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel.

Here is a summary of some of her points.

According to Professor Warren, of the Harvard Law School, no federal agency is looking out for the consumer when it comes to such matters as credit cards, mortgages, check overdraft fees, and car loans. She has been pushing for the formation of a new consumer agency for much of the last year, and it is currently the subject of Congressional negotiations.

Professor Warren believes that the current regulatory framework is “inefficient, and either ignored and ineffective, or captured by the large financial institutions. A fractured, bloated, overly fat — I just don’t know what else to say — regulatory system is what we’ve got now. It works very well for the large financial institutions because it means no effective regulation.”

Regarding the proposed Consumer Protection Agency, she says “You’ve got to have an agency that’s ultimately independent, whether it’s located within the Fed, within Treasury, the Department of Agriculture, or whether it sits in its own separate place. The key is whether or not it is functionally independent — does it write its own rules, does it enforce those rules, and does it have access to a budget that’s independent of the folks who want to smother it.”

“This is an agency that just makes sense. It’s about readable credit cards, it’s about readable mortgages, it’s about prices that are transparent. This isn’t liberal or conservative. The American Enterprise Institute, very well respected, very conservative, has put model two-page mortgage agreements, two page check overdraft agreements on its Web site. … A consumer agency makes sense to get the market working again. So this isn’t a division of ideology. This is about bank lobbyists. This is about people who are paid professionally to stop this agency, their words, “to kill this agency” so they can protect the revenues for the Wall Street banks.”

By the way, Professor Warren also has some very interesting observations on how the government mishandled the financial crisis and what to do about the “too big to fail” financial institutions. So do watch the entire video, if you have the time.

And for a not-so-serious article on the same subject you can learn how the Presidential Reunion video was made possible by reading the New York Times story.

While not directly involved in the making of the video, Ms. Warren did comment on the video’s premise. “Why wouldn’t our past presidents agree on shrinking government by transforming a bunch of bloated, ineffective and unaccountable consumer-protection bureaucracies into a smaller, streamlined, and effective agency? And why wouldn’t they all support two-page credit card agreements?”

Conclusion

Pardon me for getting political (an arena I try very hard to stay out of), but one indication of whether Congress can pass any meaningful reform on anything is whether it can withstand intense lobbying against consumer finance protection. Today Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut is scheduled to release his proposed legislation. We will see if his solution, which covers many more things than just consumer protection, will be acceptable to enough Senators and eventually to the American people.

If this issue is important to you, let your voice be heard. You have the ability to pass this post on to friends; simply click on the title of a post, then “Share This” to forward.

Investment Pornography, Part 1

Caught your attention, didn’t I?  Please don’t be offended by the title of this post, and please don’t snigger over it.  This is serious business, after all. Also called “Financial Pornography,” investment pornography consists of (1) alluring magazine cover headlines promising juicy riches, (2) articles featuring exciting ways to capitalize on supposed opportunities and (3) outlandish claims and predictions that may, in fact, be bad for your financial health. Finally, it has no redeeming value whatsoever (except that it is good for a laugh).

When I go to conferences held by Dimensional Fund Advisors, one of the best run and most respected mutual fund companies, the lecture known affectionately as “Investment Pornography” generally gets the most attention and the most nodding heads of recognition. The presentation consists of articles from popular finance magazines followed by a quick analysis of what actually happened. Punchline: They were spectacularly wrong, time and time again.

Future posts will cover articles that are way too optimistic and were written simply to get you riled up enough to buy a magazine, newspaper or investment newsletter. Today’s topic is of the other kind of Investment Pornography, the alarming article that promotes fear. This is the other side of the outlandish approach to getting your attention.

Sympathy and Recognition

I feel sorry for a journalist who covers the stock markets. A writer typically takes the financial news of the day (which is, more often than not, pretty muddled), and tries to make some sense of it by quoting various people who at least sound as though they know what they’re talking about.

The fact is that sometimes stock prices go up and sometimes they go down, and sometimes they don’t do anything. And no one can predict what is going to happen next. That’s why it’s best to be a buy and hold type investor. But, really, who would read that story over and over? Would you?

So although writers try to be accurate, relevant and interesting, they frequently stray into making predictions. In my opinion, trying to predict the future is futile, and can be downright dangerous. Sometimes a writer will positively mislead you and convince you to do something you will regret.

Fear Mongering

A year ago, on March 6, 2009, I took the New York Times to task for fear mongering at (possibly) just the wrong time. By coincidence the stock market hit its actual bottom a year ago on March 9th, the next business day. Read that post for an egregious article that, if followed, would have cost you dearly.

While, in general, I love the New York Times’ reporting, here is a recent example of fear mongering from the January 25th article, Volatility and Politics Spark Fears of Market Correction, by Javier C. Hernandez.

Here are some questionable quotes with my comments:

“Brace yourself for another wild ride on Wall Street.” (Sounds scary, doesn’t it?)

“Worries about the strength of the global recovery and proposals from Washington to clamp down on banks have sent fresh jitters through financial markets, prompting chatter among traders that stocks could be poised for that rare but alarming phenomenon: a correction.” (Rare and alarming? Not really; it happens more often than you’d think.)

“Over three tense days last week, stocks tumbled nearly 5 percent; the Dow posted triple-digit losses on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, ending the week at its lowest level since November.” (So? Five percent declines are quite common and mean nothing. Three days should definitely not make anyone “tense.”)

“Some analysts believe the downward momentum may continue.” (True, but other analysts don’t.)

“A confluence of all those headwinds creates a perfect storm of uncertainty on a market that had already been a bit vulnerable to a pullback,” said Quincy M. Krosby, a market strategist at Prudential Financial. (“Perfect storm”- nice phrasing; I sure hope that it didn’t convince you to abandon a well-thought out plan, though.)

“A severe decline in the market is far from assured. There are no certainties on Wall Street, and stocks have been known to bounce back after similarly turbulent periods.” (Thank you, thank you, thank you! I couldn’t have said it better myself.)

“In the near term, an unusual degree of uncertainty may bring more losses to the stock market.” (Yes, and then again it may not.)

Fast Forward Five Weeks

By contrast, after the market had gone up, the New York Times had this March 5th article: Markets Find the Upside of the Jobs Report also by Mr. Hernandez.

What a difference five weeks makes! Now, after the stock market has gone back up, we read “better-than-expected snapshot of unemployment in the United States lifted Wall Street on Friday, reinforcing hopes that the job market — and the broader economy — might be gaining strength.”

Here are more quotes with my comments.

“The fact that unemployment is not getting worse is great news for the market.” (First of all, it is possible that statistically the recession has already ended. Second, the unemployment news tells us only what has already happened, not necessarily what the stock market will do.)
…

“In light of that uncertainty, the question for Wall Street is whether the upward push can endure.” (You are free to guess what the stock market will do short-term, but no one knows.)

…

“The major indexes have recovered from their losses in January, and they are in positive territory for the year. Last week brought strong gains, with all three indexes ending the week more than 2 percent higher.” (Good thing we didn’t bail out and sell after reading that January 25th article, hmm?)

Enough

I am not picking on the New York Times. It is a must read for me every day, for its reporting and also for its opinion columnists. In truth, if I had to give up either reading the New York Times or watching TV, it would be a difficult choice.

And the New York Times is certainly not alone in its fear-mongering role; almost without trying, you can easily find dozens of predictive articles in most, if not all, national publications.   Money magazine has had many silly articles that would have cost you big bucks.  SmartMoney is frequently not-so-smart.   Business Week and Forbes should be ashamed. Time magazine is well known for its lurid front covers of Depression-like photos.

My advice is to ignore such articles, because they are in fact “Financial Pornography.” They attempt to, and often succeed in, getting people riled up, by either pandering to fear or greed. More likely than not, they are heavily influenced by what has already happened.

If they correctly predict what the markets subsequently do, it is merely a coincidence, in my opinion. Save your time and your money. Pay no attention to sensational articles with worrying predictions, or ones that identify sure-fire investments for that matter. By the time you read the story, any relevant facts are already reflected in today’s prices. It is too late to consider what you read to be useful, actionable information.

Do not be influenced by short term fluctuations or worrying articles. It is much better to have a plan and to stick with it.

Learning from Investment Mistakes, Part 2

“Individual investors tend to invest in a small number [of stocks] and they don’t know how to construct a portfolio. Professional portfolio managers control risk.” Jim Peterson, vice president at the Schwab Center for Financial Research.

My last post discussed the basic stock-bond allocation decision. This is a technique that many investment advisers use, but it is not the way most people approach investing. Most people are looking for an idea, a story or concept that they can build upon to make a winning investment, something that captures their imagination. They want to be a part of the next big thing, discovery or cure.

From time to time, a friend or acquaintance will tell me his or her investment philosophy. Years ago, one such friend offered the advice that you should “buy what you know.” That, of course, assumes that familiarity translates to good investment analysis. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this is always the case.

Take, for example, people in Rochester, N.Y., who over-weighted their portfolios with Eastman Kodak and Xerox – more’s the pity for their retirement accounts. I submit that where you live (or where you grew up or where you work) should not be the guiding factor to which stocks you buy. Suppose you had lived in Houston and bought a ton of Enron stock or lived in Charlotte and invested heavily in Wachovia Bank stock?

Another past story line I’ve heard was “buy dominant technology companies with market power” as in Cisco, Microsoft, and other highflying tech stocks. That bit of advice was proffered in 2000, incidentally, just before all those “dominant technology companies” tanked.

More recently, a friend said that he liked GE, simply because Warren Buffett had invested in it. (And Buffett must know what he is doing, after all.) Fine, but Mr. Buffett’s company bought preferred shares with powerful guarantees and plenty of sweeteners; a much better deal than you or I or any “ordinary” investor will ever get buying GE common stock on the open market.

Some people follow trends, buying what “is going up” (which really means buying what has already gone up; granted, a small difference in interpretation, but a big difference in results). A good example of this is gold, which I have been asked about recently. (I’ll write more about gold in a future post.)

And, naturally, I’m also approached by the pessimists, who talk only of deficits, higher taxes in 2011 or 2012, third world debt, possible terrorism, etc., etc.

What is to be made from all these divergent concerns and predictions? In my opinion, not much. Hot tips and stocks with a good “story” or narrative are not necessarily going to reward you as an investor, because you cannot get the past performance that you have already witnessed.

Conclusion

My approach has always been and will continue to be this: If you are an investor, then you should invest. You should not allow yourself to be influenced by the news – good or bad – or by what your friends are doing or not doing. Investing is about cost control, having a globally diversified portfolio (preferably one holding thousands of securities), and taking the amount of risk that is right for you.

It is simple, but it is not easy.

To be continued…

Learning from Investment Mistakes

What, if anything, have we learned from the recent steep stock market decline?  One lesson, I hope, is that planning and designing a portfolio that is appropriate for you and that you can live with is very important.  Read on to learn about an approach that may help you decide on the right portfolio design for you.

The Stock-Bond Decision

When meeting with clients, I emphasize that choosing a basic stock-bond mix is a very important first step in effective and productive portfolio design. Unfortunately, I sometimes encounter people who have allocated their portfolio at either extreme – 100% in stocks or 100% in money market accounts/bonds.  Very few advisors would ever recommend either approach.

Although the stock-bond decision may appear simple, it can have a profound impact on your wealth.  Studies have proven that nearly 90% of a portfolio’s long-term results are directly linked to asset allocation, and the right stock-versus-bond mix should be your first deliberate and strategic decision.

The Rationale

Because neither I nor anyone I know can predict the future, I believe in having a diversified portfolio that includes both stocks and bonds.  I “dial down” total risk by adding fixed income to the stock market mix.  Quite simply, the greater the bond allocation relative to stocks, the less risky the portfolio, but the lower the total expected return.  On the other hand, the greater the stock allocation relative to bonds, the higher the portfolio’s expected return, and the higher the associated risk.

So, how do you confidently allocate between stocks and bonds?  One method is to use model portfolios to illustrate the risk-return spectrum over time. For simplicity and clarity, the highest risk portfolio holds 100% in a stock index, while the least volatile portfolio holds 100% in high quality bonds. Between these extremes lie other stock-bond allocations, such as 80/20, 60/40, 50/50, 40/60, and 20/80.  Comparing past results side by side is illuminating and quite helpful in the decision making process.

Certainly, relying on historical performance is not foolproof, because past results are not a guarantee of future performance.   But if you compare the average annualized return and volatility (standard deviation) of each model portfolio since 1970 (for example), you have an idea of what relative risk you can expect and whether or not you can accept the potential loss.

Lately, I have found that showing how portfolios did in 2008 is very helpful in illustrating the risk-reward tradeoffs.  Analyzing just that specific year shows that diversification neither assures a profit nor guarantees against loss in a declining market, at least in the short term.

For example, a portfolio with a stock allocation of 80% declined 30% in 2008, while a portfolio of 60% stocks “only” declined by 21%.  Many people can live with a 21% decline, knowing that markets do rebound and the long term outlook is positive.  On the other hand, suffering a 30% loss (or more) could have tipped some investors into panicking and getting out of the stock market entirely, much to their chagrin today.

Refining the Stock Allocation

After establishing the basic stock-bond mix, I turn my attention to refining the stock allocation.  Depending on an investor’s individual profile, I may overweight or “tilt” the allocation toward riskier asset classes that have a history of offering average returns above the market.

Research published by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French reveals that small cap stocks have had higher average returns than large cap stocks, and “value stocks” have had higher average returns than growth stocks.  By holding a larger portion of small cap and value stocks in a portfolio, an investor increases the potential to earn higher returns for the additional risk taken.

The final step in refining the stock component is to diversify globally.  By holding an array of equity asset classes across domestic and international markets, you can reduce the impact of underperformance in a single market or region of the world.  And lest you worry about the global recession, last year developed and emerging markets grew at a rate higher than domestic markets, by 27.7% and 74.1%, respectively.

Conclusion

Over short periods of time, returns on stocks are quite variable; in other words, in any year we don’t know whether stocks will produce good results or not.  But, over a longer period of time – and this has been historically proven – stocks provide higher average returns than low-yielding bonds.  That’s why I generally recommend that investors with a long investment life ahead of them focus on achieving the higher long-term returns through investment in stocks.  As your time horizon or risk tolerance changes, you can reallocate your portfolio’s risk more in favor of bonds.

Summary

The stock-bond decision drives a large part of a portfolio’s long-term performance. During discussions with clients, I have found that examining different stock-bond combinations can help them visualize the risk-return tradeoff as they consider the range of potential outcomes over time. Once a mix is determined, it can guide more detailed choices of asset classes to hold in the portfolio. And, as one’s appetite for risk shifts over time, the allocation decision can and should be revisited.