Greed and Stupidity

Last week, I had lunch with an old friend who told me that he was very upset because he had lost so much money on his investments. He said that he was of two minds about the people who caused his pain. On the one hand, he wanted to forgive them, but on the other hand, he wanted to get even. Both, perfectly natural feelings. Of course, the problem with the revenge approach is the he did not know exactly whom to blame. Like many people, he really didn’t understand how we got into this economic mess in the first place.

Well, as previous posts have discussed, it’s a complicated tale in that there are a lot of culprits and more than enough blame to go around, including lax government regulation, unscrupulous mortgage brokers and mortgage lenders, overoptimistic rating agencies and everyone who thought real estate prices could only go up. But focusing on the banking system tells a large part of the story.

Recently, David Brooks wrote a column, Greed and Stupidity, which references some very good articles and contrasts the two theories of why and how bankers screwed up. Here are some relevant quotes regarding the two explanations – greed and stupidity.

What happened to the global economy? We seemed to be chugging along, enjoying moderate business cycles and unprecedented global growth. All of a sudden, all hell broke loose.

There are many theories about what happened, but two general narratives seem to be gaining prominence, which we will call the greed narrative and the stupidity narrative. The two overlap, but they lead to different ways of thinking about where we go from here.

The best single encapsulation of the greed narrative is an essay called “The Quiet Coup,” by Simon Johnson in The Atlantic.

Johnson begins with a trend. Between 1973 and 1985, the U.S. financial sector accounted for about 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In the 1990s, it ranged from 21 percent to 30 percent. This decade, it soared to 41 percent.

In other words, Wall Street got huge. As it got huge, its prestige grew. Its compensation packages grew. Its political power grew as well. Wall Street and Washington merged as a flow of investment bankers went down to the White House and the Treasury Department.

The result was a string of legislation designed to further enhance the freedom and power of finance. Regulations separating commercial and investment banking were repealed. There were major increases in the amount of leverage allowed to investment banks.

The second and, to me, more persuasive theory revolves around ignorance and uncertainty. The primary problem is not the greed of a giant oligarchy. It’s that overconfident bankers didn’t know what they were doing.

Many writers have described elements of this intellectual hubris. Amar Bhidé has described the fallacy of diversification. Bankers thought that if they bundled slices of many assets into giant packages then they didn’t have to perform due diligence on each one.

Benoit Mandelbrot and Nassim Taleb have explained why extreme events are much more likely to disrupt financial markets than most bankers understood.

To me, the most interesting factor is the way instant communications lead to unconscious conformity. …Global communications seem to have led people in the financial subculture to adopt homogenous viewpoints. They made the same one-way bets at the same time.

Jerry Z. Muller wrote an indispensable version of the stupidity narrative in an essay called “Our Epistemological Depression” in The American magazine. … Banks got too big to manage. Instruments got too complex to understand. Too many people were good at math but ignorant of history.

The Remedies

The greed narrative leads to the conclusion that government should aggressively restructure the financial sector. The stupidity narrative is suspicious of that sort of radicalism. We’d just be trading the hubris of Wall Street for the hubris of Washington. The stupidity narrative suggests we should preserve the essential market structures, but make them more transparent, straightforward and comprehensible. Instead of rushing off to nationalize the banks, we should nurture and recapitalize what’s left of functioning markets.

Both schools agree on one thing, however. Both believe that banks are too big. Both narratives suggest we should return to the day when banks were focused institutions — when savings banks, insurance companies, brokerages and investment banks lived separate lives.

We can agree on that reform. Still, one has to choose a guiding theory. To my mind, we didn’t get into this crisis because inbred oligarchs grabbed power. We got into it because arrogant traders around the world were playing a high-stakes game they didn’t understand.

Conclusion

I agree with Brooks’ belief that the main cause of our economic meltdown was stupidity – not understanding the real risks in using “outsized” leverage to buy risky assets. On the other hand, investment bank managers were receiving “outsized” bonuses based on short-term results, and the long term risks and ramifications was someone else’s problem.

Who says we have to choose between greed and stupidity?

Brawl Street: Jon Stewart vs. Jim Cramer

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I’m not a fan of the financial advice dispensed by CNBC’s talking heads. The “advice” is contradictory, often based on someone’s guess, and certainly not geared to your individual situation.

I find Jim Cramer, of Mad Money, particularly difficult to watch, and it’s not just the bombast. I believe that none of his recommendations make any sense. He is telling viewers which stocks will do well and which will do poorly, which is impossible to do.

Guessing which stocks to buy is not investing; it’s speculating. The public needs to understand that. So I was pleased that Jon Stewart of the Daily Show took Cramer to task. Since I believe that Jim Cramer’s infotainment gives viewers the absolutely wrong framework for successful investing, I think he got off easy.

ABC This Week with George Stephanopoulos had a roundtable discussing, among other things, whether CNBC fell down on the job covering the financial and business world.

Right at the end of the session, George Will nailed the real issue with his general rules in life.

• Don’t play poker with a man named Slim.
• Don’t buy a Rolex from someone who is out of breath.
• Don’t take financial advice from people who are shouting.

Amen.

CNBC Financial Advice

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Last week Jon Stewart of the Daily Show ridiculed the usefulness of financial predictions made on some CNBC shows.  Stewart exposed the theatrics and general silliness of many CNBC commentaries, not to mention the shameful sucking up to CEOs.

Remember that the Daily Show is on Comedy Central, so have a good laugh. This is not meant to be fair and balanced.

Yes, CNBC has had some very good interviews with the likes of investor Warren Buffet, author John Bogle and PIMCO executive and author Mohamed El-Erian. But remember that many CNBC shows are essentially infotainment; they are meant to keep you watching so that CNBC can sell ads.

By the way, keep watching the show to see a humorous but also enlightening interview with New York Times columnist Joe Nocera.

Nobody is Buying Stocks?

“One of the funny things about the stock market is that every time one person buys, another sells, and both think they are astute.” – William Feather.

As stock prices have declined this week, I have noticed some sloppy journalism. According to newspapers and TV programs, there is so much pessimism about the economy that no one is buying stocks. Clearly if everyone else is selling, you would be foolish to be a buyer.

To get a sense of this interpretation, take a look at today’s New York Times article Slump Humbling Blue-Chip Stocks, Once Dow’s Pride by Jack Healy.

Here are some relevant quotes with my comments:

“With so much uncertainty, investors are parachuting out of companies like banks, retailers and utilities, and abandoning stock markets everywhere from Asia to Europe to Wall Street.” (Parachuting? Nice metaphor.)

“No one is taking a back-seat approach. Everyone is just selling.” – Peter I. Cardillo, chief market economist at Avalon Partners.  (Everyone?)

“Nobody wants to be invested, that’s the problem. I don’t believe we’re at the bottom yet.” – Eric Ross, director of research at the brokerage firm Canaccord Adams. (Nobody?)

A similar story was portrayed in an article in the Wall Street Journal, Stocks Hit ’97 Level, Signaling Long Slump, on March 3, 2009 by Tom Lauricella and Annelena Lobb.

Here are a few quotes with my comments.

“It’s like an unending nightmare” – Kent Engelke, managing director at Capital Securities Management . (This is an exaggeration and seems to suggest prices will continue to drop.)

“The relentless decline is pushing investors to the sidelines.” (Not really. See explanation below.)

“I want to wait for a firm turnaround, and be as safe as possible,” Bijon Mishras, a financial-services consultant in New York. (Whoa, Nelly. Remember this quote and see how it turns out.)

“Nobody wants to buy a market today that they think is going to be down 2 or 3% tomorrow,” says Michael O’Rourke, chief market strategist at brokerage firm BTIG LLC. (Nobody?)

A Reality Check

Yes, the economic news coming out of everywhere is very bad, and yes, stock prices have had steep declines. But guess what? Every single time that someone sells a stock position, someone is on the other side of that transaction. Every single time. What do we call such a person? Insane? No. How about “buyer.” Sellers and buyers must be equal!

For every person who sells because he or she doesn’t like the prospects for the future (a.k.a a “pessimist”), there is someone who is buying (a.k.a. an “optimist”). That person thinks the investment is at a great price. Those two groups of investors or participants in the market have to be in equilibrium at all times.

When you look at it from that perspective, you don’t get the overwhelming sense of doom that the media creates — that there’s only one way for prices to go, and that is down. If that really is the case, then there are a lot of crazy people who are buying now.  I don’t think so.

The fact that prices have been going down does not mean that they will continue to go down. Just as in 1999, the fact that prices had been going up did not mean that it was a good time to buy stocks.

Risk/Reward

No one knows what tomorrow will bring, but unless capitalism ceases to function, stockholders will be rewarded in the long term for owning stocks and for taking risks. Yes, there is risk in owning stocks, as we have recently experienced. Since we’ve already seen the risk, how about staying around for the reward?

An old Wall Street proverb is that “Nobody rings a bell at the top or the bottom of a market.”

Are you waiting for that bell to ring? Don’t.

Financial Crisis for Beginners

I recently had dinner with my cousin who said, “I don’t understand how the economy was fine for so many years and now it isn’t fine. How did this happen? I don’t understand.”

Well, this is much too complicated a subject to discuss over just dinner, but I would imagine that many people feel the same way and are asking the same question as my cousin. “Why?”

Besides this blog, which has quite a few posts on this topic, I recommend checking out The Baseline Scenario, a web site whose tagline is “What happened to the global economy and what we can do about it.”
The founder of The Baseline Scenario is Simon Johnson, 46, currently a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management. Previously, he was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. Peter Boone and James Kwak also contribute to the site’s articles and posts.

Johnson is interviewed and quoted frequently, both in the mainstream media and on the internet. He has published many, many opinion pieces and articles on the global economic situation and possible solutions. He also writes for the New Republic and has been interviewed on NPR radio and the Charlie Rose program. Whew! It’s exhausting just following him around on the Internet!

In my opinion, The Baseline Scenario web site is so much more than just a simple blog. Rather, it’s a free online lesson on macro, monetary, and global economics.

The section, Financial Crisis for Beginners, quite effectively lessens the confusion. It covers pretty much everything, from old-fashioned bank runs to new-fangled credit default swaps. There are also very informative and helpful articles such as The Federal Reserve for Beginners and Interest Rates for Beginners. You’ll also find links to a thought-provoking article and radio interview, National Debt For Beginners.

Worth noting is the Japan’s Lost Decade article. While many economists, analysts and financial writers compare our current economic situation to the Great Depression, The Baseline Scenario suggests that “in many ways, a more relevant comparison may be the Japanese ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, when the collapse of a bubble in real estate and stock prices led to over a decade of deflation and slow growth.”

It’s quite amazing that a single web site, and one ubiquitous observer, can have such an impact on the national debate. I highly recommend that you follow the articles and posts at The Baseline Scenario.

P.S. This is my 100th post. For some reason, this is supposed to be significant.

Peggy Noonan’s Perspective on America

Whether you agree with her or not, Peggy Noonan, a columnist for The Wall Street Journal, simply writes beautifully. I found this week end’s column Who We (Still) Are to be both realistic and optimistic.

It is obvious that the United States has many problems, and it is easy to focus solely on them. A short list would include regulatory failures, bank failures, and failures of foresight and leadership at many levels. Referring to “the age of the empty suit” Noonan writes, “Those who were supposed to be watching things, making the whole edifice run, keeping it up and operating, just somehow weren’t there.”

Concerning the Bernard Madoff scandal, she writes:

That’s the big thing at the heart of the great collapse, a strong sense of absence. Who was in charge? Who was in authority? The biggest swindle in all financial history, if the figure of $50 billion is to be believed, and nobody knew about it, supposedly, but the swindler himself. The government didn’t notice, just as it didn’t notice the prevalence of bad debts that would bring down America’s great investment banks.

All this has hastened and added to the real decline in faith—the collapse in faith—the past few years in our institutions. Not only in Wall Street but in our entire economy, and in government.

On the other hand, she writes of the past achievements and the innate ability and good sense of the American people.

This is a good time to remember who we are, or rather just a few small facts of who we are. We are the largest and most technologically powerful economy in the world, the leading industrial power of the world, and the wealthiest nation in the world. … We are the oldest continuing democracy in the world, operating, since March 4, 1789, under a vibrant and enduring constitution that was formed by geniuses and is revered, still, coast to coast. We don’t make refugees, we admit them. When the rich of the world get sick, they come here to be treated, and when their children come of age, they send them here to our universities. We have a supple political system open to reform, and a wildly diverse culture that has moments of stress but plenty of give.

The point is not to say rah-rah, paint our faces blue and bray “We’re No. 1.” The point is that while terrible challenges face us—improving a sick public education system, ending the easy-money culture, rebuilding the economy—we are building from an extraordinary, brilliant and enduring base.

The other day I called former Secretary of State George Shultz, because he is wise and experienced and takes the long view. I asked if he thought we should be optimistic about our country’s fortunes and future. “Absolutely,” he said, there is “every reason to have confidence.”

Mr. Shultz laid out some particulars of his own optimism. There is “the ingenuity, the flexibility, the strengths of the national economy.” The labor force: “We are so blessed with human talent and resources.” And the American people themselves. “They have intelligence, integrity and honor.”

We should experience “the current crisis” as “a gigantic wake-up call.” We’ve been living beyond our means, both governmentally and personally. “We have to be willing to face up to our problems. But we have a capacity to roll up our sleeves and get down to work together.”

Realistic to the core, she concludes

What a task President-elect Obama has ahead. He ran on a theme of change we can believe in, but already that seems old. Only six weeks after his election he faces a need more consequential and immediate. In January, in his inaugural, he may find himself addressing something bigger, and that is: Belief we can believe in. The return of confidence. The end of absence. The return of the suit inhabited by a person. The return of the person who will take responsibility, and lead.

Investment Guru Predicted Crash

“There will always be someone predicting disaster and someone predicting great fortune. At one time or another, each will be closer to correct than the other. But it won’t matter to you if you understand this and have invested responsibly. You have a long-term plan; stick with it.” Peter Lynch.

In my previous post, one of the individuals quoted was Jeremy Grantham, a very successful money manager, who has been getting a great deal of media attention lately. He was among the “Fortune Tellers” featured in New York Magazine’s December 7th article, Oracles of Doom.

In addition, late last month, Grantham was the sole guest on PBS’s popular investment program, Consuelo Mack: WealthTrack. She described him as a modern-day “Cassandra,” noting that he predicted today’s depressed stock prices a decade ago.

I might be in the minority here but, in my opinion, being pessimistic 10 years in advance isn’t all that useful.

Now, don’t get me wrong, I think Grantham is very intelligent and quite eloquent. He’s also very convincing. The problem I have with him is that he has been bearish for so long, that eventually, he had to be right.

You can read more about his prophesies in Here Comes the Crash, an article published in the November 15, 2004 Fortune magazine.

Talk to Jeremy Grantham about the stock market, and you get the impression the sky is about to fall. For years the chairman and chief strategist of money-management firm Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo has been gleefully rattling listeners’ nerves with his claim that the excesses of the dot-com bubble still haven’t been unwound and that the market is headed for another precipitous drop. About a year ago his prediction became alarmingly specific. Shortly after this year’s election, he says, the market will sink into a “black hole,” losing about a third of its value over the next two to three years. He sounded this warning most publicly at the annual Morningstar investment conference in July. In late October, speaking from his elegant Boston townhouse, he told FORTUNE, “We’re still in the unraveling of the greatest bull market in American history.”

To be fair, from what was printed in the Fortune article, he has been right:

Using GMO’s computer models, he has made several well-timed calls. In 1982, with stocks selling at fire-sale prices and the economy recovering, he predicted the market was ripe for a “major rally.” That year the U.S. market kicked off its longest bull run ever. He also called the top of the Japanese bubble in 1989, the resurgence of U.S. large caps in 1991, and the rallies in U.S. small-cap and value stocks in 2000.

But, he has also been wrong:

He turned bearish on U.S. equities in the mid-1990s, prompting clients to shift money to other firms.

His prediction in 2004 was that “The low will come two or three years from now, at a level below 700 on the S&P.” That’s not what happened at all. In fact, the S& P 500 went up in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. Finally, in 2008, his pessimism paid off.

A web site from CXO Advisory Group rates investment “gurus.” According to them:

Jeremy Grantham has been persistently very negative about the prospects for U.S. equities (apparently since 1994), but not for international equities.

Based on subsequent stock market performance and our judgments about his forecasts for overall stock market direction, Jeremy Grantham’s forecast accuracy rate is 48%, which is about average. His forecast sample size is very small, as is our confidence in this score.

Note that carefully: 48%. One could argue that an accuracy rate of 48% is not dissimilar from simply using a coin tossed in the air to determine your prediction.

Finally, if the stock market had gone up this year, I doubt that Jeremy Grantham would be getting this much favorable press.

Experts Who Predicted Recession

“The only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable.” – John Kenneth Galbraith.

I took a look back through my files to see which market economists or analysts correctly predicted that we would eventually have such an awful recession and horrendous stock market decline. In his article, Last Christmas Before Next Recession, Paul B. Farrell of MarketWatch quotes economists and investment gurus who did not pull their punches. You won’t find a “on the one hand this and on the other hand that” quote among the lot.

Of course, this particular group is always making predictions. So please read the entire post, before you decide how “helpful” their predictions actually were.

The quotes are very slightly shortened (for dramatic effect).

Jeremy Grantham of Grantham, Mayo, Van Otterloo & Co

“Everyone agrees that there are extreme imbalances in the U.S. and the global economy … The bulls believe that all will work out … The bears believe that sooner or later these imbalances will come home to roost. … The probable winning bet [is] a very mean reversal … for the next few years.”

Gary Shilling, economist

“A bursting of the housing bubble will probably be the expansion ender. Signs of the bubble’s demise are accumulating, making a … recession probable.”

Bill Gross of Pimco

“Now after 300 basis points and 17 months of tightening — which by the way is typical of prior bear cycles as well — it should only be logical to expect a slower economy …”

Alan Greenspan

“Our budget position will substantially worsen in the coming years unless major deficit-reducing actions are taken. The consequences for the U.S. economy of doing nothing could be severe.”

Farrell goes on to recommend extreme steps to prepare for the bear market and recession.
“You need a wake up call: Total shift of consciousness, an extreme mental makeover, a massive attitude adjustment. … This is real war.”

He ends with this question, “Are you prepared to survive the recession and bear market likely to hit in 2006?”

Yup. You read that right. That’s 2006. The article was posted on December 12, 2005. Had the article been posted on December 12, 2007 that would have been really impressive. Frankly, being two years early in calling a recession is not at all useful. In point of fact, the S&P 500 had returns of 15.8% in 2006 and 5.5% in 2007.

So, what do you call people who are right, but two years early?

“Wrong.”

Is It Different This Time? Part 5

“One of the fallacies about the recent financial turbulence is that the markets are in ‘uncharted territory’ and that there are no historical precedents for the volatility, panic, or economic uncertainty that we’ve observed. To make statements like this is to admit that one has not examined historical evidence prior to the 1990′s. The fact is that we’ve observed similar panics throughout market history. – John P. Hussman.

I tend to read market commentaries with a jaundiced eye. That’s because the authors generally restate the obvious, i.e. what has already happened, or they attempt to predict the future, which is simply impossible.

The Stock Market is Not in “Uncharted Territory,” the November 17th Market Commentary by John P. Hussman is an exception. Rather than make definitive predictions, he outlines his strategy by putting the stock market and the economy in historical perspective. Here are some quotes I like:

Investors can get a good understanding of market history by examining a great deal of data, or by living through a lot of market cycles and learning something along the way. Only investors who have done neither believe that current conditions are “uncharted territory.” Veterans like Warren Buffett and Jeremy Grantham have a good handle on both historical data, and on the concept that stocks are a claim to a very long-term stream of future cash flows. They recognize that even wiping out a year or two of earnings does no major damage to the intrinsic value of companies with good balance sheets and strong competitive positions.

Most importantly, these guys never changed their standards of value even when other investors were bubbling and gurgling about a new era of productivity where knowledge-based companies would make the business cycle obsolete, and where profit margins would never mean-revert. They knew to ignore the reckless optimism then, because they understood that stocks were claims on a very long-term stream of cash flows. They know to ignore the paralyzing fear now, because they still understand that stocks are a claim on a very long-term stream of cash flows.

No thoughtful investor “calls a bottom” in the markets. Stocks are undervalued here, but they could decline further. Economic conditions are poor, but may be over or under-reflected in stock prices. Investors will find out over time, and the ebb-and-flow of information is slow enough to allow very large market fluctuations in the meantime.

Recent market conditions seem like they have no precedent only because so many investment professionals know only the data they’ve lived through. If one actually examines market data from the Great Depression, 1907, and other less extreme panics, one realizes how much the recent decline has already discounted potential economic negatives. At this point, further declines in stock prices simply increase the long-term returns that investors can expect over time. We can’t rule out the possibility that investors could get more frightened, or that they might abandon their stocks at prices that would offer extremely high long-term returns to the buyers. It is important to establish exposure slowly, but long-term investors who ignore attractive valuations are not investors at all.

The main damage that investors can do to their financial security at this point would come from selling into steep but impermanent declines.

As a side note, do your best to filter out comments like “investors are moving out of stocks and into …” or “investors are selling into this decline” or “investors are buying into this rally.” On balance, investors do not sell shares, and they don’t buy shares. Every share purchased is a share sold. The only question is what price movement is required to prompt a buyer and a seller to trade with each other. No money will come off the sidelines into stocks. No money will come out of stocks and onto the sidelines. All such talk is non-equilibrium idiocy. Keep in mind that the “market” consists of different traders with a variety of time-horizons, risk-tolerances, and analytical methods (e.g. technical, report-driven, value-conscious). It is helpful to think in terms of which group of individuals is likely to do what, and when. It is equally important to know which group of investors you belong to. As the old saying goes, if you’re at a poker table and you don’t know who the patsy is, you’re the patsy.

Conclusion

No one knows or can accurately predict where stock prices are heading in the short term. It is true that if we have another Great Depression, stock prices will decline further. It is also true that after the steep decline (which we have already experienced, and which is not unprecedented) future returns are likely to be higher, not lower.

In the long term, investors are compensated for taking risks. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that, over the long term, safe investments will have higher returns than equities.

Timing the “market bottom” is impossible, but selling stocks now will most likely result in regrets later.

photo credit: erin MC hammer

Understanding the Financial Crisis, Part 3

In a previous post, I highlighted Barry Ritholz’s article on how the financial crisis was caused by an “enormous change in lending standards … that took place during the 2002-2007 period. It was more than a subtle shift — it was an abdication of the traditional lending standards that had existed for decades, if not centuries.”

In the November 1st New York Times, Gretchen Morgenson gives details on just how badly one bank behaved during the housing boom. Was There a Loan It Didn’t Like? goes behind the scenes of mortgage lender Washington Mutual.

Briefly, senior mortgage underwriter, Keysha Cooper says she was pressured by bank managers and mortgage brokers “to approve loans, no matter what.”

“At WaMu it wasn’t about the quality of the loans; it was about the numbers,” Ms. Cooper says. “They didn’t care if we were giving loans to people that didn’t qualify. Instead, it was how many loans did you guys close and fund?

When underwriters refused to approve dubious loans, they were punished, she says.

Ms. Cooper started at WaMu in 2003 and lasted three and a half years. At first, she was allowed to do her job, she says. In February 2007, though, the pressure became intense. WaMu executives told employees they were not making enough loans and had to get their numbers up, she says.

“They started giving loan officers free trips if they closed so many loans, fly them to Hawaii for a month,” Ms. Cooper recalls. “One of my account reps went to Jamaica for a month because he closed $3.5 million in loans that month.”

One loan file was filled with so many discrepancies that she felt certain it involved mortgage fraud. She turned the loan down, she says, only to be scolded by her supervisor.

Brokers often tried to bribe Ms. Cooper to approve loans, she says. One offered to pay $900 to send her son to football summer boot camp if she would approve a loan that had been declined by a host of other lenders. “I told him no and not to disrespect me like that again,” Ms. Cooper says.

Hidden fees meant brokers could easily make between $20,000 and $40,000 on a $500,000 loan, Ms. Cooper says.

Ms. Cooper says that loans she turned down were often approved by her superiors. One in particular came back to haunt WaMu.

Vetting a loan one day, Ms. Cooper says she became suspicious when a photograph of the house being bought showed one street address while documents deeper in the file showed a different address. She contacted the appraiser, and recalls that he said that he must have erred and that he would send her the correct documents.

“I was so for sure that it was fraud I wanted to get on an airplane,” Ms. Cooper says.

The $800,000 loan was approved, but not by Ms. Cooper. Six months later, it defaulted, she says. “When they went to foreclose on the house, they found it was an empty lot,” she recalls.

Conclusion

• Ms. Cooper says she was pressured by her managers to approve mortgage loans “no matter what” including  loans that turned out to be fraudulent.
• Kerry K. Killinger, the WaMu chief executive was paid “tens of millions of dollars.”
• “WaMu was seized by federal regulators in late September, the biggest bank failure in the nation’s history.”

photo credit: Jimmy2000

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