Professor Explains Financial Crisis, Part 1

In his January 24th New York Times column, Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis, Alan S. Blinder, professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, briefly summarizes the causes of the Financial Crisis. He uses a chronological approach, listing the decisions (and the alternative advice that was ignored).

According to Blinder, the cause of our troubles “was largely a series of avoidable — yes, avoidable — human errors. Recognizing and understanding these errors will help us fix the system so that it doesn’t malfunction so badly again.”

Here is a summary of his article.

Wild Derivatives. Rather than regulate these arcane financial instruments, as Brooksley E. Born, then chairwoman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recommended in 1998, “top officials of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission squelched the idea. … Does anyone doubt that the financial turmoil would have been less severe if derivatives trading had acquired a zookeeper a decade ago?”

Sky-High Leverage.  In 2004, the S.E.C. let securities firms raise their leverage sharply. Had leverage stayed at previous levels, “these firms wouldn’t have grown as big or been as fragile.”

A Subprime Surge. “The next error came in stages, from 2004 to 2007, as subprime lending grew from a small corner of the mortgage market into a large, dangerous one. Lending standards fell disgracefully, and dubious transactions became common.”

Foreclosures. “The government’s continuing failure to do anything large and serious to limit foreclosures is tragic. …Free-market ideology, denial and an unwillingness to commit taxpayer funds all played roles. Sadly, the problem should now be much smaller than it is.”

Letting Lehman Go. “The next whopper came in September, when Lehman Brothers, unlike Bear Stearns before it, was allowed to fail. … Everything fell apart after Lehman.”

“After Lehman went over the cliff, no financial institution seemed safe. So lending froze, and the economy sank like a stone. It was a colossal error, and many people said so at the time.”

TARP’S Detour. “The final major error is mismanagement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the $700 billion bailout fund. … Instead of pursuing the TARP’s intended purposes, (Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury Secretary), used most of the funds to inject capital into banks — which he did poorly.”

Conclusion

Six fateful decisions — all made the wrong way. Imagine what the world would be like now if the housing bubble burst but those six things were different: if derivatives were traded on organized exchanges, if leverage were far lower, if subprime lending were smaller and done responsibly, if strong actions to limit foreclosures were taken right away, if Lehman were not allowed to fail, and if the TARP funds were used as directed.

All of this was possible. And if history had gone that way, I believe that the financial world and the economy would look far less grim than they do today.

Keynesian Economics, Part 1

“If you were going to turn to only one economist to understand the problems facing the economy, there is little doubt that the economist would be John Maynard Keynes. Although Keynes died more than a half-century ago, his diagnosis of recessions and depressions remains the foundation of modern macroeconomics. His insights go a long way toward explaining the challenges we now confront.” – Gregory Mankiw.

The economy is in recession, and some question if the Federal Reserve Board can use monetary policy to avoid a steep decline. Therefore, I think we will all need to reacquaint ourselves with Keynesian economics.

Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard University. His op-ed piece What Would Keynes Have Done? in today’s New York Times is a good summary and review of Keynesian economics and how it applies today.

According to Keynes, the root cause of economic downturns is insufficient aggregate demand. When the total demand for goods and services declines, businesses throughout the economy see their sales fall off. Lower sales induce firms to cut back production and to lay off workers. Rising unemployment and declining profits further depress demand, leading to a feedback loop with a very unhappy ending.

The situation reverses, Keynesian theory says, only when some event or policy increases aggregate demand. The problem right now is that it is hard to see where that demand might come from.

To read more, click here.

Understanding the Financial Crisis, Part 4

“The right blames the credit crisis on poor minority homeowners. This is not merely offensive, but entirely wrong.”… “Lending money to poor people doesn’t make you poor. Lending money poorly to rich people does.” – Daniel Gross.

In previous posts, I covered the causes of the Financial Crisis: poor mortgage lending standards, excessive risk taking by investment banks, and inadequate transparency and regulation. Not discussed in any detail is the role of government policy in causing the financial meltdown.

According to Daniel Gross writing on the web site Slate, the right wing claims the cause of the current problems is government intervention, i.e. “well meaning” social programs that encouraged home ownership by poor and middle class consumers. Gross strenuously objects to this conclusion.

Since fixing any problem necessitates truly understanding the causes of the problem, I am posting the entire article Subprime Suspects published October 7, 2008. (The original post contains links to various referenced articles.)

We’ve now entered a new stage of the financial crisis: the ritual assigning of blame. It began in earnest with Monday’s congressional roasting of Lehman Bros. CEO Richard Fuld and continued on Tuesday with Capitol Hill solons delving into the failure of AIG. On the Republican side of Congress, in the right-wing financial media (which is to say the financial media), and in certain parts of the op-ed-o-sphere, there’s a consensus emerging that the whole mess should be laid at the feet of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the failed mortgage giants, and the Community Reinvestment Act, a law passed during the Carter administration. The CRA, which was amended in the 1990s and this decade, requires banks—which had a long, distinguished history of not making loans to minorities—to make more efforts to do so.

The thesis is laid out almost daily on the Wall Street Journal editorial page, in the National Review, and on the campaign trail. John McCain said yesterday, “Bad mortgages were being backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and it was only a matter of time before a contagion of unsustainable debt began to spread.” Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer provides an excellent example, writing that “much of this crisis was brought upon us by the good intentions of good people.” He continues: “For decades, starting with Jimmy Carter’s Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, there has been bipartisan agreement to use government power to expand homeownership to people who had been shut out for economic reasons or, sometimes, because of racial and ethnic discrimination. What could be a more worthy cause? But it led to tremendous pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—which in turn pressured banks and other lenders—to extend mortgages to people who were borrowing over their heads. That’s called subprime lending. It lies at the root of our current calamity.” The subtext: If only Congress didn’t force banks to lend money to poor minorities, the Dow would be well on its way to 36,000. Or, as Fox Business Channel’s Neil Cavuto put it, “I don’t remember a clarion call that said: Fannie and Freddie are a disaster. Loaning to minorities and risky folks is a disaster.”

Let me get this straight. Investment banks and insurance companies run by centimillionaires blow up, and it’s the fault of Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and poor minorities?

These arguments are generally made by people who read the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal and ignore the rest of the paper—economic know-nothings whose opinions are informed mostly by ideology and, occasionally, by prejudice. Let’s be honest. Fannie and Freddie, which didn’t make subprime loans but did buy subprime loans made by others, were part of the problem. Poor Congressional oversight was part of the problem. Banks that sought to meet CRA requirements by indiscriminately doling out loans to minorities may have been part of the problem. But none of these issues is the cause of the problem. Not by a long shot. From the beginning, subprime has been a symptom, not a cause. And the notion that the Community Reinvestment Act is somehow responsible for poor lending decisions is absurd.

Here’s why.

The Community Reinvestment Act applies to depository banks. But many of the institutions that spurred the massive growth of the subprime market weren’t regulated banks. They were outfits such as Argent and American Home Mortgage, which were generally not regulated by the Federal Reserve or other entities that monitored compliance with CRA. These institutions worked hand in glove with Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, entities to which the CRA likewise didn’t apply. There’s much more. As Barry Ritholtz notes in this fine rant, the CRA didn’t force mortgage companies to offer loans for no money down, or to throw underwriting standards out the window, or to encourage mortgage brokers to aggressively seek out new markets. Nor did the CRA force the credit-rating agencies to slap high-grade ratings on packages of subprime debt.

Second, many of the biggest flameouts in real estate have had nothing to do with subprime lending. WCI Communities, builder of highly amenitized condos in Florida (no subprime purchasers welcome there), filed for bankruptcy in August. Very few of the tens of thousands of now-surplus condominiums in Miami were conceived to be marketed to subprime borrowers, or minorities—unless you count rich Venezuelans and Colombians as minorities. The multiyear plague that has been documented in brilliant detail at IrvineHousingBlog is playing out in one of the least-subprime housing markets in the nation.

Third, lending money to poor people and minorities isn’t inherently risky. There’s plenty of evidence that in fact it’s not that risky at all. That’s what we’ve learned from several decades of microlending programs, at home and abroad, with their very high repayment rates. And as the New York Times recently reported, Nehemiah Homes, a long-running initiative to build homes and sell them to the working poor in subprime areas of New York’s outer boroughs, has a repayment rate that lenders in Greenwich, Conn., would envy. In 27 years, there have been fewer than 10 defaults on the project’s 3,900 homes. That’s a rate of 0.25 percent.

On the other hand, lending money recklessly to obscenely rich white guys, such as Richard Fuld of Lehman Bros. or Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns, can be really risky. In fact, it’s even more risky, since they have a lot more borrowing capacity. And here, again, it’s difficult to imagine how Jimmy Carter could be responsible for the supremely poor decision-making seen in the financial system. I await the Krauthammer column in which he points out the specific provision of the Community Reinvestment Act that forced Bear Stearns to run with an absurd leverage ratio of 33 to 1, which instructed Bear Stearns hedge-fund managers to blow up hundreds of millions of their clients’ money, and that required its septuagenarian CEO to play bridge while his company ran into trouble. Perhaps Neil Cavuto knows which CRA clause required Lehman Bros. to borrow hundreds of billions of dollars in short-term debt in the capital markets and then buy tens of billions of dollars of commercial real estate at the top of the market. I can’t find it. Did AIG plunge into the credit-default-swaps business with abandon because Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now members picketed its offices? Please. How about the hundreds of billions of dollars of leveraged loans—loans banks committed to private-equity firms that wanted to conduct leveraged buyouts of retailers, restaurant companies, and industrial firms? Many of those are going bad now, too. Is that Bill Clinton’s fault?

Look: There was a culture of stupid, reckless lending, of which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the subprime lenders were an integral part. But the dumb-lending virus originated in Greenwich, Conn., midtown Manhattan, and Southern California, not Eastchester, Brownsville, and Washington, D.C. Investment banks created a demand for subprime loans because they saw it as a new asset class that they could dominate. They made subprime loans for the same reason they made other loans: They could get paid for making the loans, for turning them into securities, and for trading them—frequently using borrowed capital.

At Monday’s hearing, Rep. John Mica, R-Fla., gamely tried to pin Lehman’s demise on Fannie and Freddie. After comparing Lehman’s small political contributions with Fannie and Freddie’s much larger ones, Mica asked Fuld what role Fannie and Freddie’s failure played in Lehman’s demise. Fuld’s response: “De minimis.”

Lending money to poor people doesn’t make you poor. Lending money poorly to rich people does.

Understanding the Financial Crisis, Part 3

In a previous post, I highlighted Barry Ritholz’s article on how the financial crisis was caused by an “enormous change in lending standards … that took place during the 2002-2007 period. It was more than a subtle shift — it was an abdication of the traditional lending standards that had existed for decades, if not centuries.”

In the November 1st New York Times, Gretchen Morgenson gives details on just how badly one bank behaved during the housing boom. Was There a Loan It Didn’t Like? goes behind the scenes of mortgage lender Washington Mutual.

Briefly, senior mortgage underwriter, Keysha Cooper says she was pressured by bank managers and mortgage brokers “to approve loans, no matter what.”

“At WaMu it wasn’t about the quality of the loans; it was about the numbers,” Ms. Cooper says. “They didn’t care if we were giving loans to people that didn’t qualify. Instead, it was how many loans did you guys close and fund?

When underwriters refused to approve dubious loans, they were punished, she says.

Ms. Cooper started at WaMu in 2003 and lasted three and a half years. At first, she was allowed to do her job, she says. In February 2007, though, the pressure became intense. WaMu executives told employees they were not making enough loans and had to get their numbers up, she says.

“They started giving loan officers free trips if they closed so many loans, fly them to Hawaii for a month,” Ms. Cooper recalls. “One of my account reps went to Jamaica for a month because he closed $3.5 million in loans that month.”

One loan file was filled with so many discrepancies that she felt certain it involved mortgage fraud. She turned the loan down, she says, only to be scolded by her supervisor.

Brokers often tried to bribe Ms. Cooper to approve loans, she says. One offered to pay $900 to send her son to football summer boot camp if she would approve a loan that had been declined by a host of other lenders. “I told him no and not to disrespect me like that again,” Ms. Cooper says.

Hidden fees meant brokers could easily make between $20,000 and $40,000 on a $500,000 loan, Ms. Cooper says.

Ms. Cooper says that loans she turned down were often approved by her superiors. One in particular came back to haunt WaMu.

Vetting a loan one day, Ms. Cooper says she became suspicious when a photograph of the house being bought showed one street address while documents deeper in the file showed a different address. She contacted the appraiser, and recalls that he said that he must have erred and that he would send her the correct documents.

“I was so for sure that it was fraud I wanted to get on an airplane,” Ms. Cooper says.

The $800,000 loan was approved, but not by Ms. Cooper. Six months later, it defaulted, she says. “When they went to foreclose on the house, they found it was an empty lot,” she recalls.

Conclusion

• Ms. Cooper says she was pressured by her managers to approve mortgage loans “no matter what” including  loans that turned out to be fraudulent.
• Kerry K. Killinger, the WaMu chief executive was paid “tens of millions of dollars.”
• “WaMu was seized by federal regulators in late September, the biggest bank failure in the nation’s history.”

photo credit: Jimmy2000

Stabilize House Prices, Part 5

“Our plan would keep many more Americans in their homes, and put government money into local communities where it would make a difference. By clarifying the true value of each loan, it would also help clarify the value of securities associated with those mortgages, enabling investors to trade them again. Most important, our plan would help stabilize housing prices.” – John D. Geanakoplos and Susan P. Koniak.

I have written in previous posts about various proposals to stem the tide of mortgage foreclosures. Today’s New York Times Op-Ed piece Mortgage Justice Is Blind by John D. Geanakoplos and Susan P. Koniak is the latest entry.

They cover familiar territory, blaming subprime loans and securitization and quickly summarize the problem.

The current American economic crisis, which began with a housing collapse that had devastating consequences for our financial system, now threatens the global economy. But while we are rushing around trying to pick up all the other falling dominos, the housing crisis continues, and must be addressed.

We start with this simple fact: Too many families are being thrown out of their homes when it makes more sense to let them stay by “reworking” their mortgages — adjusting terms to make it possible for the homeowners to meet their responsibilities. In many cases, adjusting loans would help the homeowners and the lenders: the new mortgages would have lower monthly payments that homeowners could afford to pay, and would end up giving the lenders more money than the 50 cents on the dollar that many foreclosure sales are bringing these days.

To arrive at their solution, the authors first focus on the incentives of the “master servicer” which manages the pool of loans that are bundled together. In the old days when one banker lent money to one consumer each knew the other. If the borrower experienced financial difficulty, the lender had the ability and the incentive to renegotiate the mortgage.

With the advent of securitization, it is the “master servicer” who manages hundreds if not thousands of mortgages. They have very little incentive to rework the loans, fearing legal liability from investors. In addition, Geanakoplos and Koniak point out that the servicers will not be adequately compensated for the extra work.

As a result, “the master servicer now holds the power to rework the loans. And, as we have seen in the current crisis, these servicers aren’t doing that, as house after house goes into foreclosure.”
 
To solve this problem, we propose legislation that moves the reworking function from the paralyzed master servicers and transfers it to community-based, government-appointed trustees. These trustees would be given no information about which securities are derived from which mortgages, or how those securities would be affected by the reworking and foreclosure decisions they make.

Instead of worrying about which securities might be harmed, the blind trustees would consider, loan by loan, whether a reworking would bring in more money than a foreclosure. The government expense would be limited to paying for the trustees — no small amount of money, but much cheaper than first paying off the security holders by buying out the loans, which would then have to be reworked anyway. Our plan would also be far more efficient than having judges attempt this role. The trustees would be hired from the ranks of community bankers, and thus have the expertise the judiciary lacks.

Americans have repeatedly been told that the distressed loans cannot be reworked because these mortgages can no longer be “put back together.” But that is not true. Our plan does not require that the loans be reassembled from the securities in which they are now divided, nor does it require the buying up of any loans or securities. It does require the transfer of the servicers’ duty to rework loans to government trustees. It requires that restrictions in some servicing contracts, like those on how many loans can be reworked in each pool, be eliminated when the duty to rework is transferred to the trustees.

Under our plan, servicers would provide the homeowner’s name and other relevant information on each loan to a central government clearing house, which would in turn give trustees the data on homes in their local area. Once the trustees have examined the loans — leaving some unchanged, reworking others and recommending foreclosure on the rest — they would pass those decisions to the government clearing house for transmittal back to the appropriate servicers.

The servicers would then do exactly the same work they do now, passing on the payments they collect from the reworked mortgages to the securities’ owners in each pool. The servicers would also foreclose on those properties the trustees had decided did not qualify for reworking. For performing those tasks, the servicers would continue to receive the fees due under their existing contracts.

We need an innovative approach to overcome the gridlock that plagues our housing markets. Otherwise, we imperil millions of homeowners and — through the alchemy of derivatives — the American and global economy.

I think their solution to the problems of falling home prices, abandonment and foreclosure is very interesting. It adds to previous suggestions.

News reports have indicated that the Bush Administration will unveil their plan shortly. We’ll see what aspects of the various proposals they will recommend.

photo credit: TheTruthAbout…

Stabilize House Prices, Part 4

“Housing prices are continuing to decline. Until that decline is halted, bad things are going to continue to dominate this country’s — indeed, the world’s — economic life.” – Joe Nocera.

Shouldn’t We Rescue Housing?, Joe Nocera’s column in Saturday’s New York Times, focuses on the problem of house foreclosures and what must be done to stop a downward spiral.

So far, under the Rescue Plan, the Federal Reserve has added a tremendous amount of liquidity to the banking system. In addition, “the Treasury Department just pumped $125 billion into the country’s largest financial institutions, and it promises to use another $125 billion — more, if necessary — to recapitalize regional and community banks.”

They are vital steps. This week, at long last, the credit markets thawed, at least a little, and the global recapitalization of the banking system is the reason.

But the job isn’t done yet. The government now needs to tackle what R. Glenn Hubbard, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Bush, calls “the elephant in the room”: the continuing decline of housing prices.

I’ve seen estimates suggesting as many as one out of every six homeowners has a troubled mortgage. This is an enormous social problem. It is also a continuing economic problem. In the year since the crisis began, the world’s financial institutions have written down around $500 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities. Unless something is done to stem the rapid decline of housing values, these institutions are likely to write down an additional $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion. In other words, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

If housing prices keep falling, many millions of additional homeowners will find themselves, through no fault of their own, with underwater mortgages. Besides, foreclosures damage property values for everyone, not just those losing their homes.

Nocera mentions Sheila Bair, chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, and her efforts to do more for homeowners; the Hubbard and Mayer plan to allow all residential mortgages on primary residences to be refinanced into 30-year fixed-rate mortgages at 5.25 percent; and Yale economist John D. Geanakoplos’ recommendations to “modify mortgage loans to keep homeowners in their homes.” Nocera is sent many plans to solve the foreclosure problem.  Here is one he really likes.

But recently a proposal came across my desk that I believe is so smart, and so sensible, that I hope our nation’s policy makers will give it a serious look. It comes from Daniel Alpert, a founding partner of Westwood Capital, a small investment bank. I have quoted Mr. Alpert frequently in recent columns, because he has been both thoughtful and prescient on the subject of the financial crisis.

Here’s his idea: Pass a law that encourages homeowners with impaired mortgages to forfeit the deed to their lenders but allows them to stay in the homes for five years, paying prevailing market rent. Under the law Mr. Alpert envisions, the lender would be forced to accept the deed, and the rent. After five years, the homeowner-turned-renter would have the right to buy the home back, at fair market value, from the lender.

There are so many things I like about this idea that I hardly know where to begin. Let’s start with the fact that it doesn’t require a large infusion of taxpayers’ money. Indeed, it doesn’t require any government money at all. It also doesn’t let either homeowners or lenders off the hook, as many other plans would. The homeowner loses the deed to his home, which will be painful. The lending institution, in accepting prevailing market rent, will get maybe 60 or 70 percent of what it would have gotten from a healthy mortgage-payer. (Rents are considerably lower than mortgage payments right now.) That will be painful too. Moral hazard will not be an issue.

Nocera’s blog, has a link to Mr. Alpert’s detailed description of how his plan would work.

photo credit: Casey Serin

Stabilize House Prices, Part 3

“It’s the borrowers defaulting. That is what’s causing the distress at the institution level. So why not tackle the borrower problem?” – Sheila Bair

Damian Paletta has written a series of excellent articles in The Wall Street Journal on the beyond-the-scenes negotiations of the government’s $700 billion bailout/rescue plan. His October 16, 2008 article FDIC Chief Raps Rescue for Helping Banks Over Homeowners is another argument strongly in favor of addressing the more immediate problems of declining property values, defaulting mortgage loans and subsequent foreclosures, which are at the very core of the financial crisis.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair on Wednesday criticized the federal government for failing to take more aggressive steps to prevent Americans from losing their homes, highlighting a rift between her and other senior U.S. officials over terms of the $700 billion rescue package.

The government plan will help stabilize financial markets but it doesn’t do enough to address home foreclosures, the root of the crisis, she said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.

“Why there’s been such a political focus on making sure we’re not unduly helping borrowers but then we’re providing all this massive assistance at the institutional level, I don’t understand it,” she said. “It’s been a frustration for me.”

Ms. Bair’s comments are expected to provide new fodder for critics of the government’s response to the financial crisis, especially among those who say it has done too little to help families falling behind in their mortgage payments.

“I support all the measures; I’ve been a part of all the measures that have been taken,” she said. “But we’re attacking it at the institution level as opposed to the borrower level, and it’s the borrowers defaulting. That is what’s causing the distress at the institution level. So why not tackle the borrower problem?”

The agency’s growing role has given her views a more prominent platform after spending much of this year arguing her point from the sidelines.

Ms. Bair, a one-time Republican congressional candidate and children’s book author, had suggested direct action to modify mortgages en masse before many other regulators in Washington. In April, she pitched a plan that would authorize the Treasury Department to make loans to as many as one million homeowners to minimize foreclosures. In July, after failed thrift IndyMac Bancorp Inc. reopened its doors under FDIC control, the agency said it would halt foreclosures on the mortgages it owned and would try to modify loans for struggling homeowners.  

Ms. Bair is scheduled to be on The Charlie Rose TV program this evening.

The Financial Crisis: Why Were Warnings Ignored?

“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future” – Niels Bohr

Gary Becker an economist and Richard Posner a judge, both at the University of Chicago, write a joint blog. It is frequently very thoughtful and worth reading, although usually long and a bit academic for some.

Their October 12th post The Financial Crisis: Why Were Warnings Ignored? asks a very important question. Here is a summary of their thoughts.

Richard Posner’s Opinion

Posner thinks the problem was a failure to synthesize all of the warnings. His analogy is the failure to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbor, although there were indications from 1941 on that something like that could happen.

He singles out “a perfectly reputable academic economist, a professor at New York University named Nouriel Roubini who for years had been predicting with uncanny accuracy what has happened.”

In September of 2006–two years ago–he had “announced that a crisis was brewing. In the coming months and years, he warned, the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. He laid out a bleak sequence of events: homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt. These developments, he went on, could cripple or destroy hedge funds, investment banks and other major financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Until mid-September, the magnitude of the crisis was greatly underestimated by government, the business community, and the economics profession, including specialists in financial economics.

Why were the warnings ignored rather than investigated? First, preconceptions played a role. Many economists and political leaders are heavily invested in a free market ideology which teaches that markets are robust and self-regulating. The experience with deregulation, privatization, and the many economic success stories that followed the collapse of communism supported belief in the free market. The belief was reinforced, in the case of the financial system, by advances in financial economics, and relatedly by the development of new financial instruments that were believed to have increased the resilience of the financial system to shocks.

Second, doing something to reduce the risks warned against would have been costly. Had banks been required to increase their reserves, this would have reduced the amount they could lend, and interest rates would have risen, which would have accelerated the bursting of the housing bubble…

The deeper problem is that it is difficult and indeed often impossible to do responsible cost-benefit analysis of measures to prevent a contingency from materializing if the probability of that happening is unknown.

Which brings me to the last and most important reason for the neglect of the warning signs, because it suggests the possibility of responding in timely fashion to future risks of financial disaster. That is the absence of a machinery (other than the market itself) for aggregating and analyzing information bearing on large-scale economic risk.

In any event, no effort to determine the probability of financial disaster was made and no contingency plans for dealing with such an event were drawn up. The failure to foresee and prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to efforts to improve national-security intelligence; the failure to foresee and prevent the current financial crisis should lead to efforts to improve financial intelligence.

Becker’s Opinion – Why the Warnings Were Ignored: Too Many False Alarms

Becker has “a somewhat different take than Posner on why warning signals were ignored.”

The period since the early 1980s until the crisis erupted involved both rapid economic growth for most of the world, and unprecedented stability in this growth. Inflation rates were low and fluctuations in real output, as measured by the size and duration of recessions, were modest compared to the past. Economists and central bankers like Greenspan believed that we had learned how to keep inflation low, and also had the capacity to smooth out fluctuations in output and employment.

The second relevant development has been advances in financial instruments, such as derivatives, securitization, credit-backed swaps, and other even more esoteric instruments. These instruments seemed to work quite well in managing, spreading and even reducing the risk of the assets held by banks and other institutions. However, in the process they encouraged greater risk-taking ventures, as reflected by the large increase in the leverage-that is, in the ratio of assets to capital- of banks and financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. What has been insufficiently understood is that the growing use of these instruments, and the growing leverage of financial institutions, created considerable aggregate risk for the system as a whole that could not be diversified away.

This combination of growing central bank confidence in its ability to iron out various wrinkles in economic performance, and the belief that the new financial instruments would help manage and reduce risk, blinded the vast majority of economists (I include myself), bankers, and government regulators to the vulnerability of the whole system. This vulnerability was especially important for aggregate shocks akin to a classical run on banks. When institutions are highly leveraged, they have great difficulty coping with a massive loss of confidence in the system.

While giving credit to Roubini, Becker lists several disasters during the past several decades that were predicted but never happened:

After the huge one-day stock market collapse in October 1987, Business Week and other magazines and newspapers warned that a Great Depression might soon be coming. These dire forecasts turned out to be completely wrong. Similar highly negative, but wrong economic forecasts, were made during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the internet bubble, and the aftermath of the 9/11 attack.

In an atmosphere where the world economy showed great capacity to withstand difficult shocks, it is not at all surprising that some forecasts of disaster that turned out to be more correct were ignored.

In addition, one should not minimize the great economic achievements of the past 25 years in the form of rapid growth in world GDP, low world inflation, and low unemployment in most countries. Perhaps these achievements will be overshadowed by a deep world recession, but that remains to be seen. If the impact of this financial crisis on the real economy is not both very severe and very prolonged, and time will answer that question, the combination of the past 2 1/2 decades of remarkable achievement, and the economic turbulence that followed, may still look good when placed in full historical perspective.

Conclusion

I appreciate Becker’s perspective that for more than 25 years, the world has seen substantial growth and short recessions. However, this long term success led to overconfidence and excessive risk taking. While everything was working well, investment banks and other financial institutions could achieve large profits. With interest rates so low, borrowing money to increase profits seemed to make sense.

Cassandras are often wrong. The prevailing belief is that markets are usually right in sorting out risks and rewards. (George Soros disagrees with this ideology.)

The problem is that too many people based their decisions on the belief that housing prices could only go up. Unfortunately, too many houses were built and too many people who could not afford the houses were able to get mortgages, often with artificially low “teaser rates.” Now we are dealing with the fallout.

To see how Wall Street took on too much risk, see How Wall Street Became a Giant Hedge Fund.

photo credit: pangalactic gargleblaster

Criticism of the U.S. Bailout Plan, Part 5

“The unblinkable fact is that Americans own too much house. We overpaid and overborrowed, and many of us are ‘upside down,’ as the car dealers say. What to do? Recognize the losses and write them off. What not to do? Inflate the currency and debase accounting standards.” – James Grant.

An October 5th Washington Post editorial entitled Bad Medicine by James Grant, the editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, criticizes the Government’s bailout plan. He blames our current problems on the bursting of the housing bubble exacerbated by the Federal Reserve’s low interest policy.

Grant’s main points are:

• The bubble was brought on by too low interest rates and too much optimism.
• Wall Street investment banks were quick to cash in on the boom, but were slow to recognize the turn in the market and the attendant losses in their portfolios.
• The answer is to let prices reflect their market values, not to mask those reduced values by artificial government intervention.

Low interest rates, easy money and malleable accounting rules are what plunged Wall Street into crisis. Yet it is low interest rates, easy money and malleable accounting rules that top the list of federal fixes.

The unblinkable fact is that Americans own too much house. We overpaid and overborrowed, and many of us are “upside down,” as the car dealers say. What to do? Recognize the losses and write them off. What not to do? Inflate the currency and debase accounting standards.

But inflation and debasement are the very policies being put in place. The Federal Reserve, not waiting for Congress, embarked last month on a radical program of money-printing. Reserve Bank credit — the raw material of bank lending — is growing at the year-over-year rate of 61 percent.

After the stock market broke in 2000, then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan set about easing policy. In company with Fed Governor Ben S. Bernanke, the man who wound up succeeding him, Greenspan warned against “deflation.”

So it pushed the “federal funds rate” — the interest rate that the Fed directly controls — to 1 percent in mid-2003 and kept it there for a full 12 months.

American consumers pinched themselves. Could they really borrow more than 100 percent of the price of a house at an unimaginably low teaser rate without so much as presenting proof of employment? Indeed, they could. House prices went up and up.

When, in 2006, the roof began to fall in, Wall Street was in a quandary. It held outsize volumes of triple-A-rated mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). That they were not, in fact, triple-A, had become painfully obvious.

Prices can be unwelcome pieces of information. When an especially unwelcome batch wells up after a financial collapse, governments try to quash it. So it is today. The SEC has suppressed short selling. The bailout bill will open the door to the suspension of market-value accounting. The Fed is moving heaven and earth to cheapen the value of the dollar.

Long after the crisis burst into the open, the Fed and Treasury downplayed it. It was, they insisted, “contained.” Last week they asserted that, unless the House voted “yea,” the wheels would come off this $14 trillion economy. President Bush himself has broadly hinted that the nation is on the cusp of disaster.

How can they be so sure? And how can they know that the unintended consequences of the radical policies they are pushing through won’t be worse than the panic that they themselves are helping to foment? When the Fed insists it has no choice but to print up hundreds of billions of new dollars and when the keepers of accounting standards bend in the face of criticism that market prices hurt, what they are really saying is the that financial truth is too awful to bear. Heaven help us all if they’re right.

photo credit: Matti Mattila

Criticism of the U.S. Bailout Plan, Part 4

Economics Unplugged: A conversation with Professors Allan Meltzer and Marvin Goodfriend is a just released 60 minute interview which took place on April 22, 2008. Meltzer and Goodfreind, two professors of Economics at Carnegie Mellon, discuss the current financial crisis and how we got here.

As free market economists, they continue to be very skeptical that increased federal regulation and oversight will be enough to avert future problems. In their opinion, increased regulation will not work, because although lawyers write regulations and accountants enforce them, the management of banks and investment banks will always find a way to circumvent them (regulations).

Bank management has an incentive to take big risks to earn large rewards, and the rewards are incorrectly based on short term results. Meltzer thinks bank executives should be paid “on the average of their performance over five years, not quarter by quarter. There are other ways of doing that, but we have to change their incentives, otherwise we are going to have these problems.”

If you believe that better regulation is the solution to the financial crisis, you might find a different viewpoint interesting.

Their key points are:

• The main problem is that financial institutions lend on a long term basis, but borrow on a short term one. Periodically, there is going to be a problem.
• Regulation has a limited role to play in disciplining markets.
• Think about incentives when writing regulations.

Other observations are:

• The current situation is very different from the Great Depression.
• Banks have to recognize their losses and raise more capital.
• We will not know how bad the economy will get, until we see how far housing prices will fall.
• We are seeing the end of the American Century, where the United States had a dominant influence on what happened in the rest of the world.

Although this interview is almost 6 months old, Professor Meltzer recently expressed similar conclusions. On September 23rd on a PBS News Hour program, he was asked whether he thought the bailout plan was a good idea. His response, “It’s a terrible idea. It’s undemocratic. It’s bad economic policy, and it’s bad social policy. And it has a very little chance of solving the problem in a meaningful way.”

photo credit: Matti Mattila

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