Financial Crisis for Beginners

I recently had dinner with my cousin who said, “I don’t understand how the economy was fine for so many years and now it isn’t fine. How did this happen? I don’t understand.”

Well, this is much too complicated a subject to discuss over just dinner, but I would imagine that many people feel the same way and are asking the same question as my cousin. “Why?”

Besides this blog, which has quite a few posts on this topic, I recommend checking out The Baseline Scenario, a web site whose tagline is “What happened to the global economy and what we can do about it.”
The founder of The Baseline Scenario is Simon Johnson, 46, currently a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management. Previously, he was chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. Peter Boone and James Kwak also contribute to the site’s articles and posts.

Johnson is interviewed and quoted frequently, both in the mainstream media and on the internet. He has published many, many opinion pieces and articles on the global economic situation and possible solutions. He also writes for the New Republic and has been interviewed on NPR radio and the Charlie Rose program. Whew! It’s exhausting just following him around on the Internet!

In my opinion, The Baseline Scenario web site is so much more than just a simple blog. Rather, it’s a free online lesson on macro, monetary, and global economics.

The section, Financial Crisis for Beginners, quite effectively lessens the confusion. It covers pretty much everything, from old-fashioned bank runs to new-fangled credit default swaps. There are also very informative and helpful articles such as The Federal Reserve for Beginners and Interest Rates for Beginners. You’ll also find links to a thought-provoking article and radio interview, National Debt For Beginners.

Worth noting is the Japan’s Lost Decade article. While many economists, analysts and financial writers compare our current economic situation to the Great Depression, The Baseline Scenario suggests that “in many ways, a more relevant comparison may be the Japanese ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, when the collapse of a bubble in real estate and stock prices led to over a decade of deflation and slow growth.”

It’s quite amazing that a single web site, and one ubiquitous observer, can have such an impact on the national debate. I highly recommend that you follow the articles and posts at The Baseline Scenario.

P.S. This is my 100th post. For some reason, this is supposed to be significant.

Professor Explains Financial Crisis, Part 1

In his January 24th New York Times column, Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis, Alan S. Blinder, professor of Economics and Public Affairs at Princeton University, briefly summarizes the causes of the Financial Crisis. He uses a chronological approach, listing the decisions (and the alternative advice that was ignored).

According to Blinder, the cause of our troubles “was largely a series of avoidable — yes, avoidable — human errors. Recognizing and understanding these errors will help us fix the system so that it doesn’t malfunction so badly again.”

Here is a summary of his article.

Wild Derivatives. Rather than regulate these arcane financial instruments, as Brooksley E. Born, then chairwoman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission recommended in 1998, “top officials of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission squelched the idea. … Does anyone doubt that the financial turmoil would have been less severe if derivatives trading had acquired a zookeeper a decade ago?”

Sky-High Leverage.  In 2004, the S.E.C. let securities firms raise their leverage sharply. Had leverage stayed at previous levels, “these firms wouldn’t have grown as big or been as fragile.”

A Subprime Surge. “The next error came in stages, from 2004 to 2007, as subprime lending grew from a small corner of the mortgage market into a large, dangerous one. Lending standards fell disgracefully, and dubious transactions became common.”

Foreclosures. “The government’s continuing failure to do anything large and serious to limit foreclosures is tragic. …Free-market ideology, denial and an unwillingness to commit taxpayer funds all played roles. Sadly, the problem should now be much smaller than it is.”

Letting Lehman Go. “The next whopper came in September, when Lehman Brothers, unlike Bear Stearns before it, was allowed to fail. … Everything fell apart after Lehman.”

“After Lehman went over the cliff, no financial institution seemed safe. So lending froze, and the economy sank like a stone. It was a colossal error, and many people said so at the time.”

TARP’S Detour. “The final major error is mismanagement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, the $700 billion bailout fund. … Instead of pursuing the TARP’s intended purposes, (Henry M. Paulson Jr., the former Treasury Secretary), used most of the funds to inject capital into banks — which he did poorly.”

Conclusion

Six fateful decisions — all made the wrong way. Imagine what the world would be like now if the housing bubble burst but those six things were different: if derivatives were traded on organized exchanges, if leverage were far lower, if subprime lending were smaller and done responsibly, if strong actions to limit foreclosures were taken right away, if Lehman were not allowed to fail, and if the TARP funds were used as directed.

All of this was possible. And if history had gone that way, I believe that the financial world and the economy would look far less grim than they do today.

How Citigroup Got Into Trouble

“Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing.” – Warren Buffett.

In previous posts, I wrote about the poor job some investment banks did in risk management and how they ended up “owning exotic securities, derivatives, pieces of paper backed by pools of assets. They did not understand these securities any better than the people they sold them to.

An article in today’s New York Times, The Reckoning – Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, by Eric Dash and Julie Creswell goes behind the scenes to explain just how bad things were. What is fascinating is that the article names names, i.e. the people who were trading the securities and the risk managers, who failed to rein them in.

Of course, top management was ultimately responsible for the debacle.  Looking back, one question comes to mind, “What were they thinking?” The authors answer that question.

Here are extensive quotes from the article.

In September 2007, with Wall Street confronting a crisis caused by too many souring mortgages, Citigroup executives gathered in a wood-paneled library to assess their own well-being.

There, Citigroup’s chief executive, Charles O. Prince III, learned for the first time that the bank owned about $43 billion in mortgage-related assets. He asked Thomas G. Maheras, who oversaw trading at the bank, whether everything was O.K.

Mr. Maheras told his boss that no big losses were looming, according to people briefed on the meeting who would speak only on the condition that they not be named.

For months, Mr. Maheras’s reassurances to others at Citigroup had quieted internal concerns about the bank’s vulnerabilities. But this time, a risk-management team was dispatched to more rigorously examine Citigroup’s huge mortgage-related holdings. They were too late, however: within several weeks, Citigroup would announce billions of dollars in losses.

Normally, a big bank would never allow the word of just one executive to carry so much weight. Instead, it would have its risk managers aggressively look over any shoulder and guard against trading or lending excesses.

But many Citigroup insiders say the bank’s risk managers never investigated deeply enough. Because of longstanding ties that clouded their judgment, the very people charged with overseeing deal makers eager to increase short-term earnings — and executives’ multimillion-dollar bonuses — failed to rein them in, these insiders say.

Today, Citigroup, once the nation’s largest and mightiest financial institution, has been brought to its knees by more than $65 billion in losses, write-downs for troubled assets and charges to account for future losses. More than half of that amount stems from mortgage-related securities created by Mr. Maheras’s team — the same products Mr. Prince was briefed on during that 2007 meeting.

Citigroup’s stock has plummeted to its lowest price in more than a decade, closing Friday at $3.77. At that price the company is worth just $20.5 billion, down from $244 billion two years ago. Waves of layoffs have accompanied that slide, with about 75,000 jobs already gone or set to disappear from a work force that numbered about 375,000 a year ago.

While much of the damage inflicted on Citigroup and the broader economy was caused by errant, high-octane trading and lax oversight, critics say, blame also reaches into the highest levels at the bank. Earlier this year, the Federal Reserve took the bank to task for poor oversight and risk controls in a report it sent to Citigroup.

The bank’s downfall was years in the making and involved many in its hierarchy, particularly Mr. Prince and Robert E. Rubin, an influential director and senior adviser.

Citigroup insiders and analysts say that Mr. Prince and Mr. Rubin played pivotal roles in the bank’s current woes, by drafting and blessing a strategy that involved taking greater trading risks to expand its business and reap higher profits. Mr. Prince and Mr. Rubin both declined to comment for this article.

For a time, Citigroup’s megabank model paid off handsomely, as it rang up billions in earnings each quarter from credit cards, mortgages, merger advice and trading.

But when Citigroup’s trading machine began churning out billions of dollars in mortgage-related securities, it courted disaster. As it built up that business, it used accounting maneuvers to move billions of dollars of the troubled assets off its books, freeing capital so the bank could grow even larger. Because of pending accounting changes, Citigroup and other banks have been bringing those assets back in-house, raising concerns about a new round of potential losses.

To some, the misery at Citigroup is no surprise. Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant with the Securities and Exchange Commission, said the bank’s balkanized culture and pell-mell management made problems inevitable.

“If you’re an entity of this size,” he said, “if you don’t have controls, if you don’t have the right culture and you don’t have people accountable for the risks that they are taking, you’re Citigroup.”

Questions on Oversight

Though they carry less prestige and are paid less than Wall Street traders and bankers, risk managers can wield significant clout. Their job is to monitor trading floors and inquire about how a bank’s money is being invested, so they can head off potential problems before blow-ups occur. Though risk managers and traders work side by side, they can have an uncomfortable coexistence because the monitors can put a brake on trading.

That is the way it works in theory. But at Citigroup, many say, it was a bit different.

David C. Bushnell was the senior risk officer who, with help from his staff, was supposed to keep an eye on the bank’s bond trading business and its multibillion-dollar portfolio of mortgage-backed securities. Those activities were part of what the bank called its fixed-income business, which Mr. Maheras supervised.

One of Mr. Maheras’s trusted deputies, Randolph H. Barker, helped oversee the huge build-up in mortgage-related securities at Citigroup. But Mr. Bushnell, Mr. Maheras and Mr. Barker were all old friends, having climbed the bank’s corporate ladder together.

Because Mr. Bushnell had to monitor traders working for Mr. Barker’s bond desk, their friendship raised eyebrows inside the company among those concerned about its controls.

After all, traders’ livelihoods depended on finding new ways to make money, sometimes using methods that might not be in the bank’s long-term interests. But insufficient boundaries were established in the bank’s fixed-income unit to limit potential conflicts of interest involving Mr. Bushnell and Mr. Barker, people inside the bank say.

Indeed, some at Citigroup say that if traders or bankers wanted to complete a potentially profitable deal, they could sometimes rely on Mr. Barker to convince Mr. Bushnell that it was a risk worth taking.

Risk management “has to be independent, and it wasn’t independent at Citigroup, at least when it came to fixed income,” said one former executive in Mr. Barker’s group who, like many other people interviewed for this article, insisted on anonymity because of pending litigation against the bank or to retain close ties to their colleagues. “We used to say that if we wanted to get a deal done, we needed to convince Randy first because he could get it through.”

Others say that Mr. Bushnell’s friendship with Mr. Maheras may have presented a similar blind spot.

“Because he has such trust and faith in these guys he has worked with for years, he didn’t ask the right questions,” a former senior Citigroup executive said, referring to Mr. Bushnell.”

According to a former Citigroup executive, Mr. Prince started putting pressure on Mr. Maheras and others to increase earnings in the bank’s trading operations, particularly in the creation of collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s — securities that packaged mortgages and other forms of debt into bundles for resale to investors.

Because C.D.O.’s included so many forms of bundled debt, gauging their risk was particularly tricky; some parts of the bundle could be sound, while others were vulnerable to default.

“Chuck Prince going down to the corporate investment bank in late 2002 was the start of that process,” a former Citigroup executive said of the bank’s big C.D.O. push. “Chuck was totally new to the job. He didn’t know a C.D.O. from a grocery list, so he looked for someone for advice and support. That person was Rubin. And Rubin had always been an advocate of being more aggressive in the capital markets arena. He would say, ‘You have to take more risk if you want to earn more.’ “

It appeared to be a good time for building up Citigroup’s C.D.O. business. As the housing market around the country took flight, the C.D.O. market also grew apace as more and more mortgages were pooled together into newfangled securities.

From 2003 to 2005, Citigroup more than tripled its issuing of C.D.O.’s, to more than $20 billion from $6.28 billion, and Mr. Maheras, Mr. Barker and others on the C.D.O. team helped transform Citigroup into one of the industry’s biggest players. Firms issuing the C.D.O.’s generated fees of 0.4 percent to 2.5 percent of the amount sold — meaning Citigroup made up to $500 million in fees from the business in 2005 alone.

Even as Citigroup’s C.D.O. stake was expanding, its top executives wanted more profits from that business. Yet they were not running a bank that was up to all the challenges it faced, including properly overseeing billions of dollars’ worth of exotic products, according to Citigroup insiders and regulators who later criticized the bank.
 

In 2005, as Citigroup began its effort to expand from within, Mr. Rubin peppered his colleagues with questions as they formulated the plan. According to current and former colleagues, he believed that Citigroup was falling behind rivals like Morgan Stanley and Goldman, and he pushed to bulk up the bank’s high-growth fixed-income trading, including the C.D.O. business.

Former colleagues said Mr. Rubin also encouraged Mr. Prince to broaden the bank’s appetite for risk, provided that it also upgraded oversight — though the Federal Reserve later would conclude that the bank’s oversight remained inadequate.

Once the strategy was outlined, Mr. Rubin helped Mr. Prince gain the board’s confidence that it would work.

After that, the bank moved even more aggressively into C.D.O.’s. It added to its trading operations and snagged crucial people from competitors. Bonuses doubled and tripled for C.D.O. traders. Mr. Barker drew pay totaling $15 million to $20 million a year, according to former colleagues, and Mr. Maheras became one of Citigroup’s most highly compensated employees, earning as much as $30 million at the peak — far more than top executives like Mr. Bushnell in the risk-management department.

In December 2005, with Citigroup diving into the C.D.O. business, Mr. Prince assured analysts that all was well at his bank.

“Anything based on human endeavor and certainly any business that involves risk-taking, you’re going to have problems from time to time,” he said. “We will run our business in a way where our credibility and our reputation as an institution with the public and with our regulators will be an asset of the company and not a liability.”

Yet as the bank’s C.D.O. machine accelerated, its risk controls fell further behind, according to former Citigroup traders, and risk managers lacked clear lines of reporting. At one point, for instance, risk managers in the fixed-income division reported to both Mr. Maheras and Mr. Bushnell — setting up a potential conflict because that gave Mr. Maheras influence over employees who were supposed to keep an eye on his traders.

C.D.O.’s were complex, and even experienced managers like Mr. Maheras and Mr. Barker underestimated the risks they posed, according to people with direct knowledge of Citigroup’s business. Because of that, they put blind faith in the passing grades that major credit-rating agencies bestowed on the debt.

While the sheer size of Citigroup’s C.D.O. position caused concern among some around the trading desk, most say they kept their concerns to themselves.

“I just think senior managers got addicted to the revenues and arrogant about the risks they were running,” said one person who worked in the C.D.O. group. “As long as you could grow revenues, you could keep your bonus growing.”

To make matters worse, Citigroup’s risk models never accounted for the possibility of a national housing downturn, this person said, and the prospect that millions of homeowners could default on their mortgages. Such a downturn did come, of course, with disastrous consequences for Citigroup and its rivals on Wall Street.

Even as the first shock waves of the subprime mortgage crisis hit Bear Stearns in June 2007, Citigroup’s top executives expressed few concerns about their bank’s exposure to mortgage-linked securities.

In fact, when examiners from the Securities and Exchange Commission began scrutinizing Citigroup’s subprime mortgage holdings after Bear Stearns’s problems surfaced, the bank told them that the probability of those mortgages defaulting was so tiny that they excluded them from their risk analysis, according to a person briefed on the discussion who would speak only without being named.

Meanwhile, regulators have criticized the banking industry as a whole for relying on outsiders — in particular the ratings agencies — to help them gauge the risk of their investments.

“There is really no excuse for institutions that specialize in credit risk assessment, like large commercial banks, to rely solely on credit ratings in assessing credit risk,” John C. Dugan, the head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the chief federal bank regulator, said in a speech earlier this year.

But he noted that what caused the largest problem for some banks was that they retained dangerously big positions in certain securities — like C.D.O.’s — rather than selling them off to other investors.

“What most differentiated the companies sustaining the biggest losses from the rest was their willingness to hold exceptionally large positions on their balance sheets which, in turn, led to exceptionally large losses,” he said.

In fact, some analysts say they believe that the $25 billion that the federal government invested in Citigroup this fall might not be enough to stabilize it.

Others say the fact that such huge amounts have yet to steady the bank is a reflection of the severe damage caused by Citigroup’s appetites.

“They pushed to get earnings, but in doing so, they took on more risk than they probably should have if they are going to be, in the end, a bank subject to regulatory controls,” said Roy Smith, a professor at the Stern School of Business at New York University. “Safe and soundness has to be no less important than growth and profits but that was subordinated by these guys.”

photo credit: TheTruthAbout…

The Financial Crisis: Why Were The Experts Wrong?

“Speculative bubbles are caused by contagious excitement about investment prospects. I find that in casual conversation, many of my mainstream economist friends tell me that they are aware of such excitement, too. But very few will talk about it professionally.” – Robert Shiller.

Robert Shiller is a Professor of Economics and Finance at Yale University and the author of “Irrational Exuberance,” a book that was first published in 2000. In his book, Shiller warned that the stock market had become a bubble and could have a sharp decline, which, of course, it did. In the 2005 update of that bestseller, he stated clearly, “that a catastrophic collapse of the housing and stock markets could be on its way.”

If someone is right once, you could chalk it up to pure luck. But when you’re spot on twice – well, that looks a lot like skill to me.

In today’s edition of The New York Times, in a column entitled Challenging the Crowd in Whispers, Not Shouts, Shiller writes how he felt about going against the consensus, and how many economists might “pull their punches” to avoid being ostracized or at least, losing credibility. This column helps to answer the question Gary Becker and Richard Posner asked: The Financial Crisis: Why Were Warnings Ignored?

Alan Greenspan, the former Federal Reserve chairman, acknowledged in a Congressional hearing last month that he had made an “error” in assuming that the markets would properly regulate themselves, and added that he had no idea a financial disaster was in the making. What’s more, he said the Fed’s own computer models and economic experts simply “did not forecast” the current financial crisis.

Mr. Greenspan’s comments may have left the impression that no one in the world could have predicted the crisis. Yet it is clear that well before home prices started falling in 2006, lots of people were worried about the housing boom and its potential for creating economic disaster. It’s just that the Fed did not take them very seriously.

According to Shiller, the bubble was obvious even to the casual observer.

For example, I clearly remember a taxi driver in Miami explaining to me years ago that the housing bubble there was getting crazy. With all the construction under way, which he pointed out as we drove along, he said that there would surely be a glut in the market and, eventually, a disaster.

But why weren’t the experts at the Fed saying such things? And why didn’t a consensus of economists at universities and other institutions warn that a crisis was on the way?

For the answer, Shiller turns to social psychology and behavioral economics. Briefly, even experts fear ostracism, and many economists use only a limited set of tools regarding speculative bubbles.

The field of social psychology provides a possible answer. In his classic 1972 book, “Groupthink,” Irving L. Janis, the Yale psychologist, explained how panels of experts could make colossal mistakes. People on these panels, he said, are forever worrying about their personal relevance and effectiveness, and feel that if they deviate too far from the consensus, they will not be given a serious role. They self-censor personal doubts about the emerging group consensus if they cannot express these doubts in a formal way that conforms with apparent assumptions held by the group.

Members of the Fed staff were issuing some warnings. But Mr. Greenspan was right: the warnings were not predictions. They tended to be technical in nature, did not offer a scenario of crashing home prices and economic confidence, and tended to come late in the housing boom.

From my own experience on expert panels, I know firsthand the pressures that people — might I say mavericks? — may feel when questioning the group consensus.

I was connected with the Federal Reserve System as a member the economic advisory panel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York from 1990 until 2004… In my position on the panel, I felt the need to use restraint. While I warned about the bubbles I believed were developing in the stock and housing markets, I did so very gently, and felt vulnerable expressing such quirky views. Deviating too far from consensus leaves one feeling potentially ostracized from the group, with the risk that one may be terminated.

In 2005, in the second edition of my book “Irrational Exuberance,” I stated clearly that a catastrophic collapse of the housing and stock markets could be on its way. I wrote that “significant further rises in these markets could lead, eventually, to even more significant declines,” and that this might “result in a substantial increase in the rate of personal bankruptcies, which could lead to a secondary string of bankruptcies of financial institutions as well,” and said that this could result in “another, possibly worldwide, recession.

I distinctly remember that, while writing this, I feared criticism for gratuitous alarmism. And indeed, such criticism came.

I gave talks in 2005 at both the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in which I argued that we were in the middle of a dangerous housing bubble. I urged these mortgage regulators to impose suitability requirements on mortgage lenders, to assure that the loans were appropriate for the people taking them.

The reaction to this suggestion was roughly this: yes, some staff members had expressed such concerns, and yes, officials knew about the possibility that there was a bubble, but they weren’t taking any of us seriously.

I based my predictions largely on the recently developed field of behavioral economics, which posits that psychology matters for economic events. Behavioral economists are still regarded as a fringe group by many mainstream economists. Support from fellow behavioral economists was important in my daring to talk about speculative bubbles.

Speculative bubbles are caused by contagious excitement about investment prospects. I find that in casual conversation, many of my mainstream economist friends tell me that they are aware of such excitement, too. But very few will talk about it professionally.

Why do professional economists always seem to find that concerns with bubbles are overblown or unsubstantiated? I have wondered about this for years, and still do not quite have an answer. It must have something to do with the tool kit given to economists (as opposed to psychologists) and perhaps even with the self-selection of those attracted to the technical, mathematical field of economics. Economists aren’t generally trained in psychology, and so want to divert the subject of discussion to things they understand well. They pride themselves on being rational. The notion that people are making huge errors in judgment is not appealing.

In addition, it seems that concerns about professional stature may blind us to the possibility that we are witnessing a market bubble. We all want to associate ourselves with dignified people and dignified ideas. Speculative bubbles, and those who study them, have been deemed undignified.

In short, Mr. Janis’s insights seem right on the mark. People compete for stature, and the ideas often just tag along.

Stabilize House Prices, Part 5

“Our plan would keep many more Americans in their homes, and put government money into local communities where it would make a difference. By clarifying the true value of each loan, it would also help clarify the value of securities associated with those mortgages, enabling investors to trade them again. Most important, our plan would help stabilize housing prices.” – John D. Geanakoplos and Susan P. Koniak.

I have written in previous posts about various proposals to stem the tide of mortgage foreclosures. Today’s New York Times Op-Ed piece Mortgage Justice Is Blind by John D. Geanakoplos and Susan P. Koniak is the latest entry.

They cover familiar territory, blaming subprime loans and securitization and quickly summarize the problem.

The current American economic crisis, which began with a housing collapse that had devastating consequences for our financial system, now threatens the global economy. But while we are rushing around trying to pick up all the other falling dominos, the housing crisis continues, and must be addressed.

We start with this simple fact: Too many families are being thrown out of their homes when it makes more sense to let them stay by “reworking” their mortgages — adjusting terms to make it possible for the homeowners to meet their responsibilities. In many cases, adjusting loans would help the homeowners and the lenders: the new mortgages would have lower monthly payments that homeowners could afford to pay, and would end up giving the lenders more money than the 50 cents on the dollar that many foreclosure sales are bringing these days.

To arrive at their solution, the authors first focus on the incentives of the “master servicer” which manages the pool of loans that are bundled together. In the old days when one banker lent money to one consumer each knew the other. If the borrower experienced financial difficulty, the lender had the ability and the incentive to renegotiate the mortgage.

With the advent of securitization, it is the “master servicer” who manages hundreds if not thousands of mortgages. They have very little incentive to rework the loans, fearing legal liability from investors. In addition, Geanakoplos and Koniak point out that the servicers will not be adequately compensated for the extra work.

As a result, “the master servicer now holds the power to rework the loans. And, as we have seen in the current crisis, these servicers aren’t doing that, as house after house goes into foreclosure.”
 
To solve this problem, we propose legislation that moves the reworking function from the paralyzed master servicers and transfers it to community-based, government-appointed trustees. These trustees would be given no information about which securities are derived from which mortgages, or how those securities would be affected by the reworking and foreclosure decisions they make.

Instead of worrying about which securities might be harmed, the blind trustees would consider, loan by loan, whether a reworking would bring in more money than a foreclosure. The government expense would be limited to paying for the trustees — no small amount of money, but much cheaper than first paying off the security holders by buying out the loans, which would then have to be reworked anyway. Our plan would also be far more efficient than having judges attempt this role. The trustees would be hired from the ranks of community bankers, and thus have the expertise the judiciary lacks.

Americans have repeatedly been told that the distressed loans cannot be reworked because these mortgages can no longer be “put back together.” But that is not true. Our plan does not require that the loans be reassembled from the securities in which they are now divided, nor does it require the buying up of any loans or securities. It does require the transfer of the servicers’ duty to rework loans to government trustees. It requires that restrictions in some servicing contracts, like those on how many loans can be reworked in each pool, be eliminated when the duty to rework is transferred to the trustees.

Under our plan, servicers would provide the homeowner’s name and other relevant information on each loan to a central government clearing house, which would in turn give trustees the data on homes in their local area. Once the trustees have examined the loans — leaving some unchanged, reworking others and recommending foreclosure on the rest — they would pass those decisions to the government clearing house for transmittal back to the appropriate servicers.

The servicers would then do exactly the same work they do now, passing on the payments they collect from the reworked mortgages to the securities’ owners in each pool. The servicers would also foreclose on those properties the trustees had decided did not qualify for reworking. For performing those tasks, the servicers would continue to receive the fees due under their existing contracts.

We need an innovative approach to overcome the gridlock that plagues our housing markets. Otherwise, we imperil millions of homeowners and — through the alchemy of derivatives — the American and global economy.

I think their solution to the problems of falling home prices, abandonment and foreclosure is very interesting. It adds to previous suggestions.

News reports have indicated that the Bush Administration will unveil their plan shortly. We’ll see what aspects of the various proposals they will recommend.

photo credit: TheTruthAbout…

Stabilize House Prices, Part 4

“Housing prices are continuing to decline. Until that decline is halted, bad things are going to continue to dominate this country’s — indeed, the world’s — economic life.” – Joe Nocera.

Shouldn’t We Rescue Housing?, Joe Nocera’s column in Saturday’s New York Times, focuses on the problem of house foreclosures and what must be done to stop a downward spiral.

So far, under the Rescue Plan, the Federal Reserve has added a tremendous amount of liquidity to the banking system. In addition, “the Treasury Department just pumped $125 billion into the country’s largest financial institutions, and it promises to use another $125 billion — more, if necessary — to recapitalize regional and community banks.”

They are vital steps. This week, at long last, the credit markets thawed, at least a little, and the global recapitalization of the banking system is the reason.

But the job isn’t done yet. The government now needs to tackle what R. Glenn Hubbard, the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Bush, calls “the elephant in the room”: the continuing decline of housing prices.

I’ve seen estimates suggesting as many as one out of every six homeowners has a troubled mortgage. This is an enormous social problem. It is also a continuing economic problem. In the year since the crisis began, the world’s financial institutions have written down around $500 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities. Unless something is done to stem the rapid decline of housing values, these institutions are likely to write down an additional $1 trillion to $1.5 trillion. In other words, we ain’t seen nothin’ yet.

If housing prices keep falling, many millions of additional homeowners will find themselves, through no fault of their own, with underwater mortgages. Besides, foreclosures damage property values for everyone, not just those losing their homes.

Nocera mentions Sheila Bair, chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, and her efforts to do more for homeowners; the Hubbard and Mayer plan to allow all residential mortgages on primary residences to be refinanced into 30-year fixed-rate mortgages at 5.25 percent; and Yale economist John D. Geanakoplos’ recommendations to “modify mortgage loans to keep homeowners in their homes.” Nocera is sent many plans to solve the foreclosure problem.  Here is one he really likes.

But recently a proposal came across my desk that I believe is so smart, and so sensible, that I hope our nation’s policy makers will give it a serious look. It comes from Daniel Alpert, a founding partner of Westwood Capital, a small investment bank. I have quoted Mr. Alpert frequently in recent columns, because he has been both thoughtful and prescient on the subject of the financial crisis.

Here’s his idea: Pass a law that encourages homeowners with impaired mortgages to forfeit the deed to their lenders but allows them to stay in the homes for five years, paying prevailing market rent. Under the law Mr. Alpert envisions, the lender would be forced to accept the deed, and the rent. After five years, the homeowner-turned-renter would have the right to buy the home back, at fair market value, from the lender.

There are so many things I like about this idea that I hardly know where to begin. Let’s start with the fact that it doesn’t require a large infusion of taxpayers’ money. Indeed, it doesn’t require any government money at all. It also doesn’t let either homeowners or lenders off the hook, as many other plans would. The homeowner loses the deed to his home, which will be painful. The lending institution, in accepting prevailing market rent, will get maybe 60 or 70 percent of what it would have gotten from a healthy mortgage-payer. (Rents are considerably lower than mortgage payments right now.) That will be painful too. Moral hazard will not be an issue.

Nocera’s blog, has a link to Mr. Alpert’s detailed description of how his plan would work.

photo credit: Casey Serin

Stabilize House Prices, Part 3

“It’s the borrowers defaulting. That is what’s causing the distress at the institution level. So why not tackle the borrower problem?” – Sheila Bair

Damian Paletta has written a series of excellent articles in The Wall Street Journal on the beyond-the-scenes negotiations of the government’s $700 billion bailout/rescue plan. His October 16, 2008 article FDIC Chief Raps Rescue for Helping Banks Over Homeowners is another argument strongly in favor of addressing the more immediate problems of declining property values, defaulting mortgage loans and subsequent foreclosures, which are at the very core of the financial crisis.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair on Wednesday criticized the federal government for failing to take more aggressive steps to prevent Americans from losing their homes, highlighting a rift between her and other senior U.S. officials over terms of the $700 billion rescue package.

The government plan will help stabilize financial markets but it doesn’t do enough to address home foreclosures, the root of the crisis, she said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal.

“Why there’s been such a political focus on making sure we’re not unduly helping borrowers but then we’re providing all this massive assistance at the institutional level, I don’t understand it,” she said. “It’s been a frustration for me.”

Ms. Bair’s comments are expected to provide new fodder for critics of the government’s response to the financial crisis, especially among those who say it has done too little to help families falling behind in their mortgage payments.

“I support all the measures; I’ve been a part of all the measures that have been taken,” she said. “But we’re attacking it at the institution level as opposed to the borrower level, and it’s the borrowers defaulting. That is what’s causing the distress at the institution level. So why not tackle the borrower problem?”

The agency’s growing role has given her views a more prominent platform after spending much of this year arguing her point from the sidelines.

Ms. Bair, a one-time Republican congressional candidate and children’s book author, had suggested direct action to modify mortgages en masse before many other regulators in Washington. In April, she pitched a plan that would authorize the Treasury Department to make loans to as many as one million homeowners to minimize foreclosures. In July, after failed thrift IndyMac Bancorp Inc. reopened its doors under FDIC control, the agency said it would halt foreclosures on the mortgages it owned and would try to modify loans for struggling homeowners.  

Ms. Bair is scheduled to be on The Charlie Rose TV program this evening.