When Investment Firms Go Bust

“There are plenty of legitimate reasons to be concerned about our economy and the markets right now. But worrying that your retirement security might be jeopardized should your fund company fail isn’t one of them.” – Walter Updegrave.

Imagine the worst (which is currently not that difficult) and your mutual fund firm declares bankruptcy. Walter Updegrave, Money Magazine senior editor, discusses this scenario in an article published October 15th online: When investment Firms Go Bust. If you are feeling nervous about your mutual fund firm, this article will give you comfort.

Question: If an investment firm like Fidelity or T. Rowe Price goes bust would I lose the money I have in mutual funds in IRAs and other accounts? —Gerry Cheok, Gaithersburg, Maryland.

Answer: Already in this financial crisis, we’ve seen investment banks, commercial banks and mortgage firms fail or require some sort of government bailout to keep them afloat.

To date, however, no mutual fund companies have bitten the dust or required a government loan or investment to prevent them from going under. I hope that will continue to be the case, although in this wild and wooly market, I suppose anything is possible.

But the good news is that even if a fund family were to get in trouble or go belly up, the money you have invested in mutual funds – whether in an IRA, 401(k) or any other type of account for that matter – would still be safe.

Indeed, the value of your mutual fund accounts is pretty much unrelated to the health of the fund company itself.

Why? Several reasons.

Separation of assets

First, the money you invest in a mutual fund doesn’t actually become part of the assets of the mutual fund firm, as is the case when you buy a CD at a bank. Instead, your money goes to whichever mutual fund you’re buying. You receive shares in the fund for your investment, and the fund manager then invests your money in securities that become part of that fund’s portfolio of assets.

And although most people think that the mutual fund firm – be it Fidelity, T. Rowe Price or any other fund sponsor – owns the mutual funds with the firm’s name on them, that’s not the case.

The fund firm – or sponsor as it’s known in fund industry lingo – merely has an agreement with the fund to manage its assets and sell the fund’s shares. The fund itself is a separate entity from the sponsor and has its own board of directors. And the owners of the fund are the fund’s shareholders, the people like you who have invested money in the fund own its shares.

That goes for all the securities in the fund as well – stocks, bonds, Treasury bills, whatever. The mutual fund firm doesn’t own them either. The fund’s shareholders own them. So if a mutual fund company were to get into financial trouble or go into bankruptcy, the assets of the individual funds would not be available to the mutual fund company or its creditors to meet the firm’s obligations.

No funny stuff

But, ah, you may ask, in dire circumstances wouldn’t the mutual fund company somehow manage to dip into the till even if only temporarily to get them out of a financial bind? Couldn’t fund shareholders’ money be at risk that way?

Actually, the odds of a struggling fund company getting its hands on fund assets are remote at best. To avoid such malfeasance, federal law requires that the securities owned by a mutual fund be held separate from the fund’s sponsor in a custodial account, usually at a bank or trust company. The fund’s assets are also segregated from the custodian bank’s or trust company’s assets as well.

Finally, to protect shareholders from the possibility that a dishonest employee of the mutual fund company, custodian bank or some other person could get at a fund’s assets, federal law requires funds have fidelity bond insurance which covers instances of fraud, embezzlement and the like.

I’ve sketched the main outlines of how mutual funds operate. But if it would make you feel better, you can get more detail by checking out this investment company fact book.

Should you be worried?

If your mutual fund company were to fail, the assets of your fund would be secure, totally insulated from the fund sponsor’s financial problems. The failing mutual fund company would arrange for another mutual fund company to assume management of your fund, or your fund’s board of directors would do so. Either way, you and other fund shareholders – who are still the fund’s owners – would have to approve the new arrangement.

Of course, these protections have nothing to do with the market value of the funds you own in IRAs or other accounts. That will be determined by the market price of the securities owned by your fund. If your IRA is invested in shares of a mutual fund that tracks the overall stock market and the stock market drops, so will the value of your IRA. But that has nothing to do with the financial health of your fund company.

To sum up, there are plenty of legitimate reasons to be concerned about our economy and the markets right now. But worrying that your retirement security might be jeopardized should your fund company fail isn’t one of them.

photo credit: chuck.taylor

Investor Capitulation, Part 1

“Look at market fluctuations as your friend rather than your enemy; profit from folly rather than participate in it.” – Warren Buffett.

I do not believe in the concept of market timing, because no one knows what the short term direction of the stock market will be. An educated guess is about the best anyone can make. That is why a buy and hold strategy, using a well diversified portfolio, works best for most investors.

Given their own, sometimes naïve, perceptions, investors can become either too optimistic or too pessimistic. Unfortunately, it is typically easier to identify these times after the fact.

It is very easy to make predictions that turn out wrong, even if you are very knowledgeable.

For example, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned about “irrational exuberance” in 1996. He clearly thought that the high stock prices of 1996 could not be justified. Nevertheless, the stock market went up in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. Eventually, in March of 2000, stock prices began their steep decline. Needless to say, if you had heeded “Financial Guru” Greenspan’s warning in 1996, you would have lost out on 3 – 4 years of profitable gains.

In October 2002, after stock prices had fallen almost 50% from their previous highs, a lot of investors “threw in the towel” and basically gave up on stocks. They sold their holdings and stayed out of the stock market for several years. Many of those investors compounded their mistake by switching from equity mutual funds to variable annuities. (That is a topic for another post.)

Let’s assume that, right now, given the current economic climate, the majority of investors are pretty pessimistic about the future. How can we tell? There have been plenty of indicators. Stock prices have already declined more than 35% from their year-ago highs. Banks have been afraid to lend to each other. Institutional investors (pensions, university endowments) have been pulling massive amounts of money out of hedge funds. Many individual investors have been heavily selling mutual funds. And many people, and institutions, have flocked to short-term Treasury securities,  because they are known to be extremely safe investments, albeit very low yielding ones.

Now, suppose stock prices continue to fall, resulting in investors becoming even more pessimistic than they already are. How could this happen? Well, what if so many investors decided to redeem their accounts that hedge funds needed to sell off even larger amounts of stocks, bonds, and commodities just to fulfill the investors’ demands. What if individual investors continued to sell their stocks and mutual funds, only doing it in greater amounts and with far more urgency?

Panic Versus Capitulation

What is this called? Well, panic is one term. Capitulation would be another. You may be hearing this particular term more often now. What would capitulation look like? Probably like the end of the world. The Dow Jones Industrial Average would fall by 800 – 1,000 points or more in a single day. And just suppose that that the selloff continued for a second day. Imagine the ominous discussion on TV. Investors would feel discouraged, disgusted and positively sick. One reaction might be, “Get me out now, at any price!”

If that happens, and there are certainly no assurances that it won’t, then this may in fact be the best possible time to buy more stock. Of course, it is very difficult to even consider buying when prices are actually plummeting and everyone is afraid. (You should note that it is incorrect to say that there are “more sellers than buyers.” In point of fact, there is a buyer for every seller, or more aptly put, each share to be sold will be bought. It is just that the sellers are willing to accept lower stock prices than previously was the case.)

I do not know if the capitulation phase of the bear market will occur. In Prepare for the Revulsion Stage  Janice Dorn, Chief Global Risk Strategist, Ingenieux Wealth Management, Sydney, Australia predicts that capitulation of investors will probably happen. Here’s how she envisions it.

Now, we are likely to see a washout where just about everyone who has not sold will give up and sell. They will walk away from the markets and vow never to return again. This will be the complete revulsion stage. Only when this happens will the markets be in a position to begin to rebuild the technical damage. This will take time, and it now appears that the highs in the broad indices have been seen for many years to come.

People will have nightmares about the Great Crash of 2008 for years to come. They will lose trust in the entire financial system and in many of their advisors who allowed their accounts to lose somewhere between 25% and 50%. The small retail trader will leave the markets in disgust and distrust.

Dorn’s description is quite graphic. And she is saying that it is likely to happen. Make no mistake, she is predicting a once-in-a-generation change in investor perception. We’ll see if this extreme reaction comes to pass.

But please remember that stock market lows can only be identified in retrospect. Moreover, for people who follow a buy and hold approach, all of this may be of only intellectual interest. On the other hand, knowing that this kind of panic behavior can happen may steel you not to join the herd in selling at what may just be the wrong time.

photo credit: Bitterroot

Is It Different This Time? Part 4

“We cannot assume that even if the economic news gets worse that prices will decline further. It’s quite possible that prices are already reflecting investor concerns of more trouble ahead and may rise despite more gloomy business reports in days and months to come.” – Weston J. Wellington.
 
Today’s New York Times has two editorials, both of them well worth reading; one was written by Nobel prize-winning economist Paul Krugman and the other by Warren Buffett, the chairman and chief executive officer of Berkshire Hathaway, who is touted as one of history’s most successful investors. At first glance, their respective opinions seem to be diametrically opposed, but that is only true if you don’t understand how the stock market works.

In Let’s Get Fiscal, Krugman assesses the outlook for the economy saying that there is “grim news coming in about the real economy.” Summing up the economic situation, he states,

Just this week, we learned that retail sales have fallen off a cliff, and so has industrial production. Unemployment claims are at steep-recession levels, and the Philadelphia Fed’s manufacturing index is falling at the fastest pace in almost 20 years. All signs point to an economic slump that will be nasty, brutish — and long.

Krugman predicts that the unemployment rate, which is already above 6 percent, “will go above 7 percent, and quite possibly above 8 percent, making this the worst recession in a quarter-century.”

“And how long will it last? It could be very long indeed.”

Upon reading that, it would be understandable if you decide to sell all of your stocks and put the money from the proceeds “under the mattress,” so to speak. If you’re at all in agreement with Krugman’s analysis, you might want to buy “safe” CDs or, if you are totally freaked out, short-term U.S. Treasury securities, that are paying very close to zero interest.

That understandable inclination of reacting to bad current news, and worse predictions of the future, though perfectly natural, would likely also be entirely wrong. The reason is that the stock market looks forward. What is already known is “priced in the market.” Stock prices have already fallen in anticipation of a worsening economy. If and when the economy declines further, that will only confirm what we think we know now, so stock prices may not decline any more from where they currently stand.

In other words, as an investor, you cannot read the news or even someone’s prediction on where the economy is going and “profitably” act on it. In the stock market, “what everyone knows is not worth knowing.”

Please note, that nowhere does Krugman give any advice on what to do as an investor. That’s not his area of expertise. I am only projecting what a knowledgeable layman might conclude from reading Krugman’s observations.

That brings me to Warren Buffett’s opinion piece. It is an understatement to say that Buffett is a very, very, successful long-term investor. He’s been called, among other things, the Oracle of Omaha and the world’s greatest stock market investor, and an empire builder. His favorite holding period is “forever.” He certainly does not try to time the market, as he believes no one can do that successfully. (There is a lot of academic evidence that people who do try to time the market end up with terrible results.)

In Buffett’s Buy American. I Am, he agrees with Krugman’s basic thesis on the economy.

The financial world is a mess, both in the United States and abroad. Its problems, moreover, have been leaking into the general economy, and the leaks are now turning into a gusher. In the near term, unemployment will rise, business activity will falter and headlines will continue to be scary.

But here is the seeming paradox. What is Buffett doing?

I’ve been buying American stocks. This is my personal account I’m talking about, in which I previously owned nothing but United States government bonds. (This description leaves aside my Berkshire Hathaway holdings, which are all committed to philanthropy.) If prices keep looking attractive, my non-Berkshire net worth will soon be 100 percent in United States equities.

Why?

A simple rule dictates my buying: Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful. And most certainly, fear is now widespread, gripping even seasoned investors.

Since no one can forecast the short term direction of the stock market, Buffet continues:

Let me be clear on one point: I can’t predict the short-term movements of the stock market. I haven’t the faintest idea as to whether stocks will be higher or lower a month — or a year — from now. What is likely, however, is that the market will move higher, perhaps substantially so, well before either sentiment or the economy turns up. So if you wait for the robins, spring will be over.

This is typical Buffett — folksy, but right on. He then writes about the Great Depression and World War II, and notes that buying when things look bleakest was the right strategy. He concludes that “bad news is an investor’s best friend. It lets you buy a slice of America’s future at a marked-down price.”

Over the long term, the stock market news will be good. In the 20th century, the United States endured two world wars and other traumatic and expensive military conflicts; the Depression; a dozen or so recessions and financial panics; oil shocks; a flu epidemic; and the resignation of a disgraced president. Yet the Dow rose from 66 to 11,497.

You might think it would have been impossible for an investor to lose money during a century marked by such an extraordinary gain. But some investors did. The hapless ones bought stocks only when they felt comfort in doing so and then proceeded to sell when the headlines made them queasy.

Today people who hold cash equivalents feel comfortable. They shouldn’t. They have opted for a terrible long-term asset, one that pays virtually nothing and is certain to depreciate in value. Indeed, the policies that government will follow in its efforts to alleviate the current crisis will probably prove inflationary and therefore accelerate declines in the real value of cash accounts.

Equities will almost certainly outperform cash over the next decade, probably by a substantial degree. Those investors who cling now to cash are betting they can efficiently time their move away from it later.

This is my fourth post in the series called Is It Different This Time?  Feel free to read the others, especially if you are ready to hit the panic button and sell your stocks and/or stock mutual funds.

photo credit: notsogoodphotography

The Financial Crisis: Why Were Warnings Ignored?

“Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future” – Niels Bohr

Gary Becker an economist and Richard Posner a judge, both at the University of Chicago, write a joint blog. It is frequently very thoughtful and worth reading, although usually long and a bit academic for some.

Their October 12th post The Financial Crisis: Why Were Warnings Ignored? asks a very important question. Here is a summary of their thoughts.

Richard Posner’s Opinion

Posner thinks the problem was a failure to synthesize all of the warnings. His analogy is the failure to foresee the attack on Pearl Harbor, although there were indications from 1941 on that something like that could happen.

He singles out “a perfectly reputable academic economist, a professor at New York University named Nouriel Roubini who for years had been predicting with uncanny accuracy what has happened.”

In September of 2006–two years ago–he had “announced that a crisis was brewing. In the coming months and years, he warned, the United States was likely to face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. He laid out a bleak sequence of events: homeowners defaulting on mortgages, trillions of dollars of mortgage-backed securities unraveling worldwide and the global financial system shuddering to a halt. These developments, he went on, could cripple or destroy hedge funds, investment banks and other major financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Until mid-September, the magnitude of the crisis was greatly underestimated by government, the business community, and the economics profession, including specialists in financial economics.

Why were the warnings ignored rather than investigated? First, preconceptions played a role. Many economists and political leaders are heavily invested in a free market ideology which teaches that markets are robust and self-regulating. The experience with deregulation, privatization, and the many economic success stories that followed the collapse of communism supported belief in the free market. The belief was reinforced, in the case of the financial system, by advances in financial economics, and relatedly by the development of new financial instruments that were believed to have increased the resilience of the financial system to shocks.

Second, doing something to reduce the risks warned against would have been costly. Had banks been required to increase their reserves, this would have reduced the amount they could lend, and interest rates would have risen, which would have accelerated the bursting of the housing bubble…

The deeper problem is that it is difficult and indeed often impossible to do responsible cost-benefit analysis of measures to prevent a contingency from materializing if the probability of that happening is unknown.

Which brings me to the last and most important reason for the neglect of the warning signs, because it suggests the possibility of responding in timely fashion to future risks of financial disaster. That is the absence of a machinery (other than the market itself) for aggregating and analyzing information bearing on large-scale economic risk.

In any event, no effort to determine the probability of financial disaster was made and no contingency plans for dealing with such an event were drawn up. The failure to foresee and prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks led to efforts to improve national-security intelligence; the failure to foresee and prevent the current financial crisis should lead to efforts to improve financial intelligence.

Becker’s Opinion – Why the Warnings Were Ignored: Too Many False Alarms

Becker has “a somewhat different take than Posner on why warning signals were ignored.”

The period since the early 1980s until the crisis erupted involved both rapid economic growth for most of the world, and unprecedented stability in this growth. Inflation rates were low and fluctuations in real output, as measured by the size and duration of recessions, were modest compared to the past. Economists and central bankers like Greenspan believed that we had learned how to keep inflation low, and also had the capacity to smooth out fluctuations in output and employment.

The second relevant development has been advances in financial instruments, such as derivatives, securitization, credit-backed swaps, and other even more esoteric instruments. These instruments seemed to work quite well in managing, spreading and even reducing the risk of the assets held by banks and other institutions. However, in the process they encouraged greater risk-taking ventures, as reflected by the large increase in the leverage-that is, in the ratio of assets to capital- of banks and financial institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. What has been insufficiently understood is that the growing use of these instruments, and the growing leverage of financial institutions, created considerable aggregate risk for the system as a whole that could not be diversified away.

This combination of growing central bank confidence in its ability to iron out various wrinkles in economic performance, and the belief that the new financial instruments would help manage and reduce risk, blinded the vast majority of economists (I include myself), bankers, and government regulators to the vulnerability of the whole system. This vulnerability was especially important for aggregate shocks akin to a classical run on banks. When institutions are highly leveraged, they have great difficulty coping with a massive loss of confidence in the system.

While giving credit to Roubini, Becker lists several disasters during the past several decades that were predicted but never happened:

After the huge one-day stock market collapse in October 1987, Business Week and other magazines and newspapers warned that a Great Depression might soon be coming. These dire forecasts turned out to be completely wrong. Similar highly negative, but wrong economic forecasts, were made during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the internet bubble, and the aftermath of the 9/11 attack.

In an atmosphere where the world economy showed great capacity to withstand difficult shocks, it is not at all surprising that some forecasts of disaster that turned out to be more correct were ignored.

In addition, one should not minimize the great economic achievements of the past 25 years in the form of rapid growth in world GDP, low world inflation, and low unemployment in most countries. Perhaps these achievements will be overshadowed by a deep world recession, but that remains to be seen. If the impact of this financial crisis on the real economy is not both very severe and very prolonged, and time will answer that question, the combination of the past 2 1/2 decades of remarkable achievement, and the economic turbulence that followed, may still look good when placed in full historical perspective.

Conclusion

I appreciate Becker’s perspective that for more than 25 years, the world has seen substantial growth and short recessions. However, this long term success led to overconfidence and excessive risk taking. While everything was working well, investment banks and other financial institutions could achieve large profits. With interest rates so low, borrowing money to increase profits seemed to make sense.

Cassandras are often wrong. The prevailing belief is that markets are usually right in sorting out risks and rewards. (George Soros disagrees with this ideology.)

The problem is that too many people based their decisions on the belief that housing prices could only go up. Unfortunately, too many houses were built and too many people who could not afford the houses were able to get mortgages, often with artificially low “teaser rates.” Now we are dealing with the fallout.

To see how Wall Street took on too much risk, see How Wall Street Became a Giant Hedge Fund.

photo credit: pangalactic gargleblaster

Is It Different This Time? Part 3

“We are not going to have a depression, and we have survived financial crises before. A century of investing experience, as well as insights from the field of behavioral finance, suggest that investors who bail out of equities during times like these are almost always making the wrong decision.” – Burton G. Malkiel.

Alex Berenson’s October 11th article in The New York Times Those With a Sense of History May Find It’s Time to Invest is well worth reading, especially if you are discouraged enough to be considering selling your equity mutual funds and putting the money in CDs.

The four most dangerous words for investors are: This time is different.

In 1999, technology companies with no earnings or sales were valued at billions of dollars. But this time was different, investors told themselves. The Internet could not be missed at any price.

They were wrong. In 2000 and 2001 technology stocks plunged, erasing trillions of dollars in wealth.

Now investors have again convinced themselves that this time is different, that the credit crisis will push economies worldwide into the deepest recession since the Depression. Fear runs even deeper today than greed did a decade ago.

But in their panic, investors are ignoring 60 years of history. Since the Depression, governments have become far more aggressive about intervening when credit markets seize up or economies struggle. And those interventions have generally succeeded. The recessions since World War II, while hardly easy, have been far less painful than the Depression.

Berenson goes on to quote various investors and economists who believe that the pessimism is overdone and that this is a good time to buy rather than sell stocks.

If there is good and wise policy, and government moves effectively, this need not play itself out in ways like the Great Depression, which is the image that is playing itself out in people’s mind. . Government action typically does not work immediately, and banking crises around the world often require multiple interventions. – Stephen Haber, an economic historian and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

“I think in years to come — I wouldn’t say months to come — we will perceive this as being a great value-buying opportunity. Two and three years from now, it will seem very smart.” - David P. Stowell, a finance professor at Northwestern and a former managing director at JPMorgan Chase.

“This is the opportunity of a lifetime. The most important securities are being given away.” – Martin J. Whitman, a professional investor for more than 50 years.

photo credit: Sheffield Tiger

Recession or Depression? Part 3

“In their 1963 book A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz laid out their case for a different explanation of the Great Depression. … The failure of the Federal Reserve to deal with the Depression was not a sign that monetary policy was impotent, but that the Federal Reserve exercised the wrong policies. They did not claim the Fed caused the depression, only that it failed to use policies that might have stopped a recession from turning into a depression.” – Wikipedia.

Definitions: Bear Market or Crash?  from the October 10th Forbes magazine provides useful background information.

Stocks are falling, unemployment is rising and even banks seem to be hiding their money under mattresses. It’s tough to measure how bad things are and impossible to say whether they’ll get worse. With commentators throwing around words usually reserved for the worst of economic times – crash, recession, depression – the one question we can answer is what those words mean.

The economy expands and shrinks in cycles, with times of growth followed by times of contraction.

In an expansion, manufacturers build new factories, retailers open more stores and, most of the time, companies hire additional workers. The 1990s saw a decade of growth, the longest peacetime economic expansion in U.S. history.

In a recession, the economy shrinks for months. Factories produce less, cutting shifts, or laying off workers altogether. Incomes fall. Sales drop. The last recession lasted nine months ending in November 2001.

A depression is a more severe and prolonged version of a recession. In a depression, prices often fall as unemployment rises. Shoppers drastically cut their spending. In the Great Depression, which began in 1927 and lasted for more than a decade, unemployment peaked at nearly 25 percent, and many of those who did work were only able to find part-time jobs. By contrast, the current unemployment rate is 6.1 percent.

Recent talk about depressions has been sparked by worsening economic data and the frightening drop in stock prices, which has been almost as steep as the 1929 crash that began the Great Depression. Most professional investors call a 20 percent decline within a few days a crash.

A 20 percent decline over a longer time is called a bear market. A bear market is a prolonged decline in prices for stocks, bonds, commodities, or all three. While there’s debate about whether the decline of the seven trading days ending Thursday was a crash, there’s no argument that we are in a bear market. The Dow Jones industrial average is nearly 42 percent lower than it was at its highest point last October; marking the largest decline since 1973-1974.

The opposite of a bear market is a bull market, which brings a prolonged increase in the price of stocks, bonds or commodities. Market historians may point to Oct. 9, 2007 as the crest of the most recent bull market – notching a 48 percent rise over five years – and the beginning of a bear market of undetermined length.

photo credit: Lee Jordan

Recession or Depression? Part 2

 

“The Great Depression was a worldwide economic downturn starting in most places in 1929 and ending at different times in the 1930s or early 1940s for different countries. It was the largest and most important economic depression in modern history, and is used in the 21st century as a benchmark on how far the world’s economy can fall.” – Wikipedia.

From the PBS’s Nightly Business Report, October 9th here is Allan Sloan, Senior Editor-At-Large at Fortune magazine:

Everything has been so gloomy lately, I thought I’d play against type, and find something reassuring to say. The problem, though, is that it looks like things will keep getting worse for a while, as the economy and the banking system inflict more and more pain on more and more people.

The one cheerful thing I have to say is that this isn’t going to turn into another Great Depression. That’s the comparison you keep hearing. And it’s wrong. The Great Depression had 25 percent unemployment. It had millions of people losing their life savings when their banks failed and took their money down with them.

Old people had no income and no health insurance. Neither did unemployed people.

Now we have federal insurance on bank deposits. We have Social Security and health care for old people. We have unemployment insurance and other safety nets.

What’s going on now isn’t any fun. It’s not fun to see your retirement accounts get hammered. It’s not fun to have your mortgage foreclosed or lose your job. And it’s not fun if you can’t borrow money except at rates that would make a loan shark blush.

But trust me, no matter how bad this gets, it won’t be a second Great Depression. And remember that sooner or later, this mess will work itself out. Just as booms don’t last forever, neither do busts. And in this case, that’s a good thing.

I’m Allan Sloan.

photo credit: Eoghan OLionnain

Recession or Depression? Part 1

 

“Unlike during the Great Depression the government is now a huge part of the economy. And officials have moved quickly, if clumsily, to contain the crisis.” – Robert J. Samuelson.

In the October 13th Newsweek, Robert J. Samuelson asks a provocative question – Is This a Replay of 1929?  The short answer is No. There are many differences.

Watching the slipping economy and Congress’s epic debate over the Treasury’s unprecedented $700 billion financial bailout, it is impossible not to wonder whether this is 1929 all over again. Even sophisticated observers invoke the comparison. Martin Wolf, the chief economic commentator for the Financial Times, began a recent column: “It is just over three score years and ten since [the end of] the Great Depression.” What’s frightening is not any one event but the prospect that things are slipping out of control. Panic—political as well as economic—is the enemy.

There are parallels between then and now, but there are also big differences. Now, as then, Americans borrowed heavily before the crisis—in the 1920s, for cars, radios and appliances; in the past decade, for homes or against inflated home values. Now, as then, the crisis caught people by surprise and is global in scope. But unlike then, the federal government is now a huge part of the economy (20 percent vs. 3 percent in 1929) and its spending—for Social Security, defense, roads—provides greater stabilization. Unlike then, government officials have moved quickly, if clumsily, to contain the crisis.

Unlike postwar recessions, the Depression submitted neither to self-correcting market mechanisms nor government policies. Why?

Capitalism’s inherent instabilities were blamed—fairly, up to a point. Over borrowing, overinvestment and speculation chronically govern business cycles. Herbert Hoover was also blamed for being too timid—less fairly. In fact, Hoover initially expanded public works to combat the slump. The real culprit was the Federal Reserve. Depression scholarship changed forever in 1963 when economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued, in a highly detailed account, that the Fed had unwittingly transformed an ordinary, if harsh, recession into a calamity by permitting a banking collapse and a disastrous drop in the money supply.

The Great Depression resulted from the perverse mix of a weak economy and government policies that magnified the weakness and that were only partially neutralized by the New Deal. If we can avoid a comparable blunder, the great drama of these recent weeks may prove blessedly misleading.

photo credit: jillclardy

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